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ABSTRACT 
This report presents the results of a Portable Oxygen Subsystem 
development program. The report discusses the concept design 
study and the design of the prototype hardware and presents the 
prototype hardware fabrication and test programs. 
FOREWORD 
This is the Final Report for the Portable Oxygen Subsystem pro­

gram. This effort was conducted by Hamilton Standard under NASA 

Contract NAS 9-14458 for the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center of 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administ-ration from January 

1975 to November 1975. 

Special thanks are due to the Contract Technical Monitor, 

Mr. Roger Tanner, Crew Systems Division of the NASA Lyndon B. 

Johnson Space Center, for his advice and guidance. 
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1.0 SUMMARY 
Hamilton Standard has developed a Portable Oxygen Subsystem ,(-POS) 
for use in the Space Shuttle Orbiter Syst'em. This development; 
effort was conducted under Contract' NAS' 9-14458 to NASA ':s Johnson 
Space Center. The 'scope of this program included the selection, 
design" fabrication, and test of a POS ~hich meets the Shuttle 
objectives of long life, low cost and minimum maintenance . 
•The POS is a rebreather type system which provides a ,revitalized 
breathing gas supply to a crewman for denitrogenization, emergen­
cy IV activity, and/or emergency rescue. 
The program effort: included selection and,optimization of the, POS 
concept; detail design of a prototype system; fabrication and ac­
ceptance testing; and manned and unmanned performance testing of 
the prototype system. 
, , 
The concept selection effort Donsisted of evaluation of a NASA 
baseline system, identification of any deficiencies 'in the base­
line concept, defin,ition of system concepts which eliminate the 
deficiencies, evaluation and selection of the optimum concept 
based on we~ght, volume, and cost. This was followed by' optimi­
zation of the selected concept on the basis of weight, volume, 
cost, operability, and safety., The selected concept is shown 
schematically in F.igure 1-1. 
The selected system consists of a breathing circuit and ,an oxygen 
supply circuit. In operation, the crewman's exhaled C02 laden 
gas passes through the regenerative heat exchanger wher& it picks 
up heat and moisture and then passes through a check valve to a 
breathing bag. When the breathing bag is fully extended", the, ex­
halation relief valve opens allowing some of the hot, moist, C02 
laden gas to escape. Upon inhalation, the gas in the breathing 
bag is directed by the check valves to pass through a LioE bed in 
the cartridge canister assembly where the C02 is removed and 
moisture and heat are added to the gas. The gas then passes 
through the regenerative heat exchanger 'where the gas temperature 
and moisture level are reduced to approximately the leve'ls pre­
viously exhaled by the crewman. Makeup oxygen is supplied con­
tinuously either from the self contained 02 supply or f~om a ' 
vehicle umbilical connected to the fill fitting. The pr~ssure of 
the incoming gas i's reduced to a constant level by the pressure 
reducer. From the'pressure reducer, the gas enters the breathing 
circuit either through the' demand regulator which only opens if 
the crewman should' collapse the breathing bag or through a flow 
limiting orifice. During the inhalation phase, the makeup gas 
flows to the mask at the top of the visor and flows across the 
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1.0 (Continu,ed) 
visor to the crewman I s oral nasal area. During the ,exhiilation , 
phase, the pressure in the mask increases above .ambient, and the 
mak'eup flow is diverted to the 02 reservoir which is ,a small 
breathing bag. During inhalation, the gas is ,drawn fro~ the 02 
reservoir through' bhe flow compensating oorifice which is' used to 
match the flow from the reservoior with the flow from the breath­
ing bag. The' pressure gages are used to'provide 'status,monitor­
ing, and bhe high pressure relief valve is used to pre'[ent over­
pressurization of the breathing circuit .should the pressure re­
ducer fail open. 
The cartridge canister assembly, which is a replaceable item, 
contains a status indicator to assure that the LioH has not been 
exposed to degrading environments. 
Detail design drawings were prepared for the selected concept, 
and the prototype ,s·ystem, shown in' Figure 1-2, was' fabricated. 
The system was acceptance tested to verify proper performance of 
all components and was then subjected to an unmanned and manned ' 
development test program which demonstrated that the system com­
plies with the Work Statement requirements. 
Upon completion of the test program, the prototype'Portable Oxygen 
Subsyste~ was delivered to NASA. 
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FIGURE 1"2 PORTABLE OXYGEN SUBSYSTEM
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
 
In January of 1975, Hamilton Standard was awarded a contract to
 
develop a long life, low cost, low maintenance, and high relia­
bility Portable Oxygen Subsystem (POS) for use in the Space
 
Shuttle Program. This effort included the selection, optimiza­
tion, design, fabrication, and test of a prototype POS.
 
This Final Report summarizes the program effort.
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3.0 OBJECTIVES
 
The 	objectives of this program were:
 
a) 	Establish by detail evaluation the-best Portable Oxygen

Subsystem (POS) for use in the Space Shuttle Program.
 
b) 	Prepare detail drawings suitable for fabrication of a
 
prototype POS.
 
c) 	Fabricate the prototype POS.
 
d) 	Conduct sufficient development tests to verify compliance

with Work Statement requirements and to verify that the unit
 
is acceptable for further manned testing at reduced ambient
 
pressure.
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4.0 DISCUSSION
 
4.1 Background and Requirements
 
The portable Oxygen Subsystem (POS) program was conducted to. se­
lect, design, fabricate, and test a portable, regenerative breath­
ing system for us6 on the Space Shuttle Oribiter. The program
 
was conducted in accordance with the program logic shown in
 
Figure 4-1-1.
 
Ioncept Cncept. Deinaln ­
e p Or tISelection F1 Op t i m . -- L : 
Figure 4-1-1
 
Portable Oxygen Subsystem Program Logic
 
This report sectio' is divided into the following subsections
 
representing the major elements of the program work breakdown
 
structure.
 
- Concept Selection Study
 
- Concept Optimization
 
- Design
 
- Fabrication
 
- Test
 
The Portable Oxygen Subsystem (POS) is capable of performing
 
during any one of the following mission modes.
 
- Denitrogenization
 
- Emergency Intravheicular (IV) Qperation
 
- Emergency Extravehicular (EV) Operation
 
In the denitrogenization mode the POS provides,a recycled, revi­
talized gas supplyfto a crewman for three hours of operation. A
 
small quantity of gas is expelled from the system during each ex­
halation thus lowering the nitrogen level in the crewman to a
 
safe level for EVA activity at 27.6 KPa (4.0 psia). During this
 
mode of operation, makeup oxygen is supplied by the vehicle oxygen
 
system.
 
In the emergency IV mode the system provides a crewman with a
 
safe breathing supply for up to three hours while coupled to the
 
vehicle 02 supply for use in the event the cabin atmosphere be­
comes unsafe to breath. The system contains an oxygen bottle
 
capable of providing a minimum of 10 minutes of operation inde­
pendent of the vehicle 02 supply.
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In the emergency EV rescue mode the system operates for two hours
coupled to the vehicle 02 supply and then provides a minimum of
 one hour-of independent operation in a rescue enclosure used for
 
emergency EV transfer.
 
Table 4-1-1 summarizes the POS requirements.
 
4.2 Concept Selection Study
 
The concept selection study was initiated by defining the opera­ting conditions, establishing trade-off criteria, and by review­ing the NASA baseline POS. 
 The system operating conditions used
in the study are included in Table 4-2-1. 
 The trade-off criteria
consisted of unit weight, unit volume, and relative cost with
each element being equally important in selection of the concept.
The unit weight and volume were established on the basis of a
complete POS. 
 The relative cost was based on the estimated cost
to fabricate only those items which differed from concept to con­cept and a vehicle weight penalty of $22 ,000/Kg ($10,000/lb) based
 
on 8 units per flight.
 
Figure 4-2-1 represents the NASA Portable Oxygen Subsystem base­lined in the statement of work. 
It utilizes a high pressure oxy­gen system and a breath powered breathing circuit to furnish the

astronaut with a dehumidified CO2 
free supply of oxygen. The high
pressure oxygen system consists of an oxygen bottle, a vehicle
 oxygen connector, and a flow controller. The breathing circuit
consists of a full face mask, a breathing bag, a relief valve,

check valves, and a LiOH canister.
 
The oxygen bottle is sized for purge flow to allow independent op­eration for a 10 minute IV emergency or a one hour EV rescue mission.
 
The vehicle oxygen connector permits subsystem operation utiliz­ing the vehicle 6,205 KPa (900 psia) 02 supply for normal or
emergency EV denitrogenization missions or for emergency IV op­eration. For this review, a purge flow rate of 0.51 Kg/hr (1.125
lb/hr) of 02 dumped into the Shuttle cabin was assumed because it
would not impose a penalty on the vehicle and would minimize the

-LiOH required for C02 control. 
This flow rate would not crack
the Shuttle cabin dump valve if two astronauts purge this amount

of 02 into the cabin during three hours of POS normal or emergen­cy IV operation. Assuming a 102.7 KPa 
(14.9 psia) maximum regu­lated pressure and a 56.6 m3 
(2,000 ft3) Shuttle cabin volume,
the vehicle pressure will not exceed 106.9 KPa (15.5 psia) at the
end of three hours of operation. This approach represented maxi­mum practical POS 02 purge and maximum 02 conservation for the
total Shuttle system as nearly all of the 02 used for prebreath­ing is ultimately consumed and not lost overboard.
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TABLE 44i 
POS REQUIREMENTS
 
- Denitrogenization Mission Metabolic Profile
 
2 hours and 42-minutes at 844 KJ/hr (800 Btu/hr) ambient
 
101.3 KPa (14.7 psia)
 
15 minutes at 1,1 60 KJ/hr (1,100 Btu/hr) ambient
101.3 KPa (1,47 psia)
 
3 minutes at 1,582 KIhr (1,500 Btu/hr) ambient
 
101.3 KPA (14.7 psia)
 
- Emergency IV Mission Profile
 
2 hours and 42 minutes at 844 KJ/hr (800 Btu/hr) ambient
 
101.3 KPa (14.7 psia)
 
15 minutes at L,160 KJ/hr (1,100 Btu/hr) ambient
 
101.3 KPa (14.7 psia)

3 minutes at 1,,.582 J/hr (1,500 Btu/hr) ambient 
101.3 KPa '(14-.7 psia) 
10 minutes at 1,160 KJ/hr (1,100 Btu/hr) ;on bottle ambient
 
101.3 KPa (14.7 psia)
 
- Emergency EV Rescue Profile
 
2 hours at 633 JIC/hr (600 Btu/hr)-ambient 101.3 KPA
 
(14.7 psia)
 
1 hour at 844 KJ/hr (800 Btu/hr) ambient 34.5 KPa ( 5 psia)
 
- Maximum Inlet Temperature 43.30C (l1o0P)
 
- Maximum Inlet Dew Point 37.,80C (1000 F)
 
- Maximum Inlet C02 Partial Pressure at Work Rates up to 844 KJ/hr
 
(800 Btu/hr) 1.0 SPa (7.6 mm Hg)
 
- Maximum Inlet C02 Partial Pressure at -Work Rates Above 844 KJ/hr
 
(800 Btu/hr) 1.99 tKPa (15 -mmHg)
 
- Maximum Touch Temperature 450C (1130 F)
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TABLE 4-2-1 
SYSTEM OPERATING CONDITIONS 
Cabin Pressure 
Cabin Temperature 
Rescue Enclosure Pressure 
During Transfer 
Rescue Enclosure Temperature 
During Transfer 
Vehicle 02 Supply Pressure 
Vehicle 02 Supply Temperature 
Oxygen Allocation 
Cabin Relief Valve Setting 
Design Respiratory Quotient 
101.3 + 1.4 KPa (14.77 t .2 psia} 
18.33 - 26.7oC (6S - 800F) 
34.S KPa (S psia) 
21.1 - 46.loC (70 - 11SOF) 
6,20S KPa (900 psia) Nominal 
l8.30C (6SOF) Nominal 
0.23 Kg/Hr/POS (O.S Lb/Hr/POS) 
106.9 KPa (lS.S psid) 
0.9 
11 
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The oxygen controller contains a shutoff valve, 
a pressure gage
to monitor 02 bottle pressure, a demand regulator to supply 02 to
the face mask in the event that the breathing bag bottoms out and
a flow control circuit which supplies a constant flow of 0.51

Kg/hr (1.125 lb/hr) of 02.
 
The breathing bag contains a wick separator and flow distribution

channels to direct the inhaled and exhaled breath over the inter­
nal face of the bag to promote heat transfer with the ambient
environment by radiation. 
The wick immobilizes any condensate
that may be generated in the bag.
 
A relief valve is utilized to vent the purge gas to the cabin,
and the ventilation loop check valves ensure that the flow of gas
is only in one direction.
 
The lithium hydroxide canister contains lithium hydroxide to

chemi-sorb C02 from the breathing circuit. 
The reaction gener­
ates heat, which is dissipated by radiation through the canister

wall and by heating the breathing circuit gas stream, and gener­ates water thus raising the'humidity level of the gas circuit.
 
This concept, when subjected to the high metabolic rates at zero

"g" conditions, results in the face mask inlet temperature of
96.70C (2060F). 
 This is caused by the high heat of reaction of
C02 and the generation of water vapor by the LiOH.
 
Figure 4-2-2 is a flow chart of the baseline system at this
 
operating condition.
 
The LTV Shuttle EVA Rescue Study Report (T-215-RP01) indicates
that operation of this POS concept at a high gas purge rate will

result in acceptable temperature control. 
This is not practic­
ally achievable because the effective radiating surface area of
the LiOH canister is approximately one-half of the assumed LTV

value. 
This radiation area has a significant affect on the heat
rejection capability of the LiOH canister. 
Compensating for the
reduced effective area by increasing the canister source tempera­tures drives up the LiOH canister carrier gas outlet temperature
to the higher temperatures. Design of a subsystem package that
provides a canister view factor higher than 0.5 is a possible

method of increasing the effective radiation area. 
However, this
approach is impractical since the POS must be worn on the astro­naut's person, thus shielding about 50% of the actual projected

area from effective radiation.
 
The mask temperature could be reduced by increasing the size of
the breathing bag, however, the bag would require a radiant heat
transfer area in excess of 0.84 m2 
(9 ft2 ).
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11 D,;dfHAMILTON STANDARD 
FLOW SCHEMATIC - NASA RECOMMENDED SYSTEM
 
T= 37.8-C (100-F)
 
TOp = 37.8-C 0100°F) MASK
 
1.5 Kg/HR (3.3 #M/HR) 
T 96.7°C (206°F) 
TOP = 35.6C (96°F) 
QRAD = 3.37 WATTS (11.5 BTU/HR) 
T = 29.4'C (85°F) 
0.51 Kg/HR (1.125 #/HIR) 
0.0186 Kg/HR (0.041 #M/HR H20) 
0.51 Kg/HR (1.125 #/HR) 
T = 132.2°C (2700F) 
TOP =42.2*C (108 F)WCO 2 = 0 065 Kg/HR0.99Kg/R #MHR) --/HR)(.17 (0.144 
0.99q/H(2.75#/HR =-30 5WATTS 104 BTU/HR 
T - 35.6°C {96°F) WH20 = 0.027 Kq/HR 0.059 #/HR 
TOP = 35.6-C (96°F) ITWALL = 126oC (259OF) 
OMET = 322.4 WATTS (1100 BTU/HR) 101.4 KPA (14.7 PSIA) 
= VENTILATION RATE = 1A9 m3/HR (42 FT3/HR) 1.5 Kg/HR (3.3'#M/HR) @p= 1.26 Kg/m 3 (0.0785 #M/FT 3 ) 
C02 PRODUCTION RATE = 0.10 Kg/HR (0.219 #/HR) 
LiOH CAN RADIATING AREA = 0.039m 2 (60 IN2 ) - 0.039m 2 (0.42 FT2) 
BREATHER BAG RADIATING AREA = 0.07m2 (0.75 FT2) 
NOTE-	 INSTANTANEOUS FLOWRATES ARE DOUBLE THE TIME AVERAGED
 
VALVES SHOWN.
Kg WATT- HR o' Kg WAT- HR X3~ . AT
 
QO= 0.51 - X 0.277 KgC X8.33C+ 1.5-K9 X0.277 K-oC X8.33°C =4.7WATTS
 
(1.125 X 0:24 X5 + 3.3 X O.24 X5 =16 BTU/HR)
 
(VENT FLOW) (MAN)
 
FIGURE 4-2-2 PERFORMANCE CHART - NASA BASELINE 
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The remainder of the system selection study consisted primarily
 
of evaluating various means of modifying the baseline system to
 
provide the required thermal control and selecting the most
 
promising candidate.
 
Two basic approaches for providing inlet gas thermal and humidity
 
control were considered. These were use of a fusible heat sink
 
and use of a regenerative heat exchanger.
 
Figure 4-2-3 is a function schematic of a fusible heat sink. At
 
normal ambient temperature the heat sink material is a solid.
 
When hot gas enters the unit, the heat sink material melts, re­
moving heat from the'gas stream. As the gas cools, moisture in
 
the gas condenses and is trapped in the wick material.
 
Table 4-2-2 lists the phase change materials considered for use
 
in the fusible heat sink.
 
Compound Melting Point Heat Fusion
 
°C (OF) KJ/Kg (Btu/lb)
 
C17H3402 28.9 (84) 42.2 (88)

C26H54  28.9 (84) 40.3 (84)
 
CaCI 2.6H20 29.4 (84.9) 35 (73.1)
 
LiNO 3-3H20 29.8 (85.6) 61.4 (128)
 
Na2SO4 .10H20 32.4 (90.3) 52.3 (109)

C19H40 32.2 (90) 45.6 (95)
 
C24H50 35 (95) 40.8 (85)

(Cl3H27COO)3C3H3 32.8-57.2 (91-135) 41.8-43.7 (87-91)

NH20H 32.9 (91.4) 75.8 (158 (Est.))
 
Table A-2-2
 
Candidate Heat Sink Materials
 
All of these chemicals have a melting point above or close to the
 
maximum cabin ambient to permit resolidification after usage by
 
stowing the kink in the cabin. The LiNO3 .3H20 chemical was sel­
ected for the POS fusible heat sink, as the combination of its
 
high thermal conductivity of 0.711 W/m oC (0.406 Btu/hr ft OF) as
 
opposed to 0.14 W/m oC (0.08 Btu/hr ft OF) for the other chemi­
cals and its Cp of 0.27 KJ/Kg OC (0.65 Btu/lb OF) provides the
 
lightest weight, smallest volume heat sink.
 
Functionally, the regenerative heat exchanger can be simulated by
 
a pipe with screen mounted perpendicular to the flow at intervals
 
along the pipe as shown in Figure 4-2-4.
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Flow
 
A B 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 
Screens Pipe X 
Figure 4-2-4
 
Regenerative Heat Exchanger
 
The hot gas is introduced at end A. When it passes through
 
screen 1, it will heat up the screen with a resultant decrease
 
in gas temperature. As the gas passes through each successive
 
screen, additional heat is removed by heating of the screens un­
til a significantly cooler gas exits at end B. When the flow is
 
reversed, gas flowing from point B to point A will pick up heat
 
from each screen until it exits at point A at a temperature close
 
to that of the hot gas initially introduced at point A. Moisture
 
that condenses while the gas passes through the heat exchanger
 
remains in the device and is reevaporated during reverse flow of
 
the gas.
 
By neglecting heat exchanger effectiveness, time constants and
 
internal heat transfer of the screen, the device can be simply
 
explained by assuming that the change in internal energy of the
 
screen is equal to change in energy in the gas.
 
CPscreen Pscreen Vscreen Delta Tscreen = Mgas CPgas Delta Tgas e 
Where Cpscreen is the specific heat of the screen.
 
Pscreen is the density of the screen.
 
Vscreen is the volume of the screen.
 
Delta Tscreen is the initial screen temperature - the final
 
screen temperature.
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M is the mass flow of the gas.
 
CPgas is the specific heat of the gas.
 
Delta Ta s is the initial gas temperature - the final gas
temperature. •
 
e is the time the gas is flowing through the screen
 
(one way).
 
In selecting the regenerative heat exchanger packing material,
 
several factors were of prime importance. These were bed volume
 
and response time. The sphere is the densest p&cking material as
 
summarized in Table 4-2-3. Thus, for themass of packing materi­
al required, the sphere is the optimum shape.
 
Shape % Free Volume Source
 
Rings 67 Chemical Engineers Handbook
 
Saddles 65 Chemical Engineers Handbook
 
Screens 59 Calculated
 
Balls 36 Calculated
 
Table 4-2-3
 
Packing Material Volume
 
Based on the Fourier number which is a dimensionless measure of
 
response time, the sphere has the lowest thermal response time of
 
various shapes. Referring to page 48 of "Temperature Response

Charts", Schneider, P. J., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., if i~tassumed
 
that all shapes are made of the same material (thus having the
 
same diffusivity (cv= KP/Cp)) and are of the same thickness (8),

the time (9) for the center temperature to respond is least for
 
the sphere.
 
These two thermal control devices were integrated with the base­
line system resulting in the definition of three candidate POS
 
configurations.
 
Figure 4-2-5 shows-POS concept number 1 which utilizes a,'fusible

heat sink to remove latent and sensible heat from the gas stream
 
and contains a widk -separator to contain the moisture which con­
denses in the fusible sink. The thermal sink has an overall con­
ductance -that varies with time so the temperature and dew point

of the gas leaving the sink various between 300C (860 F) at the 
-
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at the beginning.vof-themission and 37.8oC (1000 F) at the end of
 
the mission. When the outlet gas from the sink mixes with the
 
makeup oxygen flow, the resultant mask inlet temperature ranges

from 29.4 0C (850F) to 36.70C (980F).
 
Figure 4-2-6 shows the second concept considered. It utilizes
 
both a regenerative heat exchanger and a fusible sink. The re­
generative heat exchanger is used to remove most of the sensible
 
heat added by the chemical reaction of the CO2 with the LiOH.
 
The fusible sink then removes the remaining sensible heat load as
 
well as the latent load generated by the LiOH/CO2 reaction. This
 
system contains a bypass around the fusible sink which allows a
 
small amount of warm, moist gas from the regenerativ'e -Hxto mix
 
with the outlet of the fusible sink andxthe 02 makeup flow. This
 
bypass is sized do that the maximum mask inlet temperature is
 
43.3 0C (ll00F) and maximum mask inlet dewpoint is 37.8 0C (1000F).
 
The use of the regenerative heat exchanger and the bypass mini7
 
mizes the size of the fusible sink required.
 
Figure 4-2-7 is a schematic of the third POS canidate. In use,
 
the hot, moist gas which exits from the LiOH cartridge passes
 
through the regenerative heat exchanger transferring hdat to the
 
bed and condensing moisture within the regenerative heat exchan­
ger. As the exhaled gas passes from the mask through the regen­
erative heat exchanger, the heat stored in the bed is transferred
 
to the gas and the moisture in the heat exchanger evaporates.
 
The regenerative heat exchanger is sized such that its mask side
 
outlet gas when mixed with the makeup oxygen has a temperature
 
less than 43.30C (1100 F) and dewpoint less than 37.8 0 C (100OF).
 
The trade-off consisted of evaluation and selection on the basis
 
of weight, volume, and relative cost. The weight and volume for
 
each configuration were established using various 02 makeup flow
 
rates. These are shown in Figures 4-2-8 and 4-2-9 respectively.
 
As shown by the Figures, the system utilizing only the regenera­
tive heat exchanger is the least weight and least volume system.
 
In assessing the relative cost of each concept only the identifi­
able differences were considered. The cost factor was comprised
 
of the fabrication cost assuming the manufacture of 50 units and
 
the launch weight penalty assuming eight POS's per flight using
 
the penalty factor of $4,545/Kg ($10,000/lb).
 
Figure 4-2-10 shows the relative cost of each of the three con­
cepts. The system utilizing the regenerative heat exchanger has
 
the lowest cost of the three approaches.
 
The system containing the regenerative heat exchanger for thermal
 
control was found to be the least weight, least volume, and least
 
costly of the concepts considered and was thus the selected con­
cept. Figure 4-2-11 is a schematic of the selected concept.
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The feasibility of the selected concept had been previously dem­onstrated by Hamilton Standard testing of a breadboard portable
breathing system which utilized a regenerative heat exchanger for
thermal control. The breadboard unit and test setup are shown in
Figure 4-2-12. 
 This testing verified the predicted performance

characteristics of the regenerative heat exchanger and provided
actual LiOH performance data at the elevated temperatures inher­ent with the system approach. 
The data from this testing pro­
vided the basis for final sizing of the prototype POS.
 
4.3 Concept Optimization
 
Prior to initiation of the system design, the selected concept

was optimized on the basis of weight, volume, cost, operability,

and safety.
 
This effort included the generation of a computer analytical mo­del for optimizing the regenerator bed, the LiOH cartridge, and
the 02 quantity; a component by component review aimed at mini­mizing cost and volume; and the generation of a detail Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to determine the adequacy of
the system. 
The computer program is discussed in Appendix A.
 
The analytical effort resulted in the final sizing of the major
system components, the regenerative heat exchanger, the LiOH car­tridge, the oxygen quantity, and radiative cooling area.
 
As a result of the component review, the bottle operating pres­sure and the 02 flow controller were changed. 
In the trade-off
study, it was assumed that the bottle operating pressure would be
6,205 KPa 
(900 psig) so that the unit could be recharged from the

vehicle 02 supply. 
During this review, it was established that
bottle recharge would only be required during the emergency IV
mode. Since the independent IV activity is limited to 10 minutes,
it was concluded that the bottle could be sized on the basis of
providing 10 minutes of operation when charged to 6,205 KPa (900
psi) instead of 60 minutes of operation after charging to 6,205
KPa (900 psi). 
 The normal charge pressure was increased to
24,129 KPa (3,500 psi) so the bottle would contain sufficient
 oxygen to provide 60 minutes of operation. This resulted in a
bottle volume savings of 1.75 x 10-3 m3 (107 in3 )
 
The oxygen flow controller utilized during the trade-off study

was a two stage device and is shown in Figure 4-3-1. The first
stage pressure reducer contained a set point selector and shutoff
feature while the second stage was a demand regulator capable of
providing various flows depending upon demand. 
This was a com­plex and costly device which required the use of a precice exha­lation relief valve setting to assure proper operation. It also
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required a manual cltange in pressure setting for use in the:res­
cue enclosure. The advantage of this system was that it shut off­
02 makeup flow during exhalation, thus minimizinq the quantity of
 
oxygen required.
 
As a result of the 6ptimization effort, a significant lehs ex­
pensive and less complex 02 flow controller was evolved. This
 
concept, shown in Figure 4-3-2, contains a separate shutoff
 
valve, a simple pressure reducer, a simple demand regulator, a
 
flow limiting orifide and small breathing bag which stores the
 
makeup oxygen durin4 exhalation. This approach retainedthe key
 
desirable feature of the initial concept, and- since the need to
 
manually change regulator settings was eliminated, it improved
 
the operability. This change reduced the cost of the prototype
 
oxygen flow controller to one half its original cost and.would
 
reduce the cost of flight hardware to one sixth that estimated
 
for the initial approach.
 
The detail Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical
 
Item List (CIL) are included in Appendix B. This analysis iden­
tified the need ta-be able to check the operation of the system
 
prior to an/or during use. A system operation and check out pro­
cedure was generated,to assure that all critical functions could
 
be checked during start up of the system. The procedure, includ­
ed in Appendix C,, identified the need for an interstage pressure
 
gage to verify proper function of the pressure reducer to assure
 
that the system would meet its independent operations require­
ments.
 
The various system changes identified during the optimization ef­
fort were combined, and the new system schematic, shown-in Figure.
 
4-3-3, was generated. The oxygen bottle (1) is sized to-contain
 
0.196 Kg (.432 lb).of oxygen at 24,129 K-Pa (3,500 psi), and if
 
only changed to 6,205 KPa (900 psi), it will provide the4 O.045 Kg
 
(0.1 lb) of gas required for ten minutes of independent IV oper­
ation. The pressure-gage (2) continuously monitors the-bottle
 
pressure making the system status easy to verify. The shutoff
 
valve (3) is located between the POS bottle and the vehicle 02
 
supply connection because the bottle-is normally charged to a
 
higher pressure than the vehicle 02 supply, and for the system to
 
retain its one hour independent operation capability, this,higher
 
pressure must be retained even while the system is operating with
 
the vehicle 02 supply. The check valve (4) in the fill line pre­
vents the sudden loss of stored gas should the POS shutoff valve
 
be open when the system,is connected to the vehicle suppiy. This
 
disconnect (5) provides a means of connecting a vehicle 02 supply
 
umbilical. The high -pressure regulator (6) reduces the-varying
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supply pressure to an essentially constant level for controlling
 
the flow through the orifice. The relief valve (7) prevents
 
overpressurization of the system in the event the high pressure

regulator fails open. The low pressure gage (8) provides a sta­
tus check on the performance of the high pressure regulator. The
 
demand regulator (9) provides additional makeup oxygen in the un­
likely event the crewman totally collapses the breathing bag.

The first orifice (10) limits the oxygen flow to the system to
 
0.227 Kg/hr (0.5 lb/hr) while at an ambient of 101 KPa (14.7 psia)

and 0.196 Kg/hr (0.42 lb/hr) while at an ambient of 34.5 KPa (5
 
psia) due to a change in the absolute outlet pressure of the high
 
pressure regulator. The second orifice (11) is used to match the
 
flow from the oxygen reservoir with the flow from the breathing

bag. The oxygen reservoir (12) is a small breathing bag used to
 
contain the makeup oxygen flow which occurs during the exhalation
 
phase of the breathing cycle. The check valve (13) prevents ex­
haled gas from reaching the 02 reservoir. The total makeup oxy­
gen is introduced at the top of the mask and the dry gas flowing
 
across the visor prevents fogging or condensation in the visor
 
area. The mask (14) is a full face mask which provides protec­
tion for the eyes as well as the oral nasal area. The regener­
ative heat exchanger (15) maintains the mask inlet temperature

and dew point at approximately the same levels as exhaled by the
 
crewman, thus preventing exposure to the high gas temperature and
 
dew point which results from the LiOH/CO2 reaction. The check
 
valve (16) upstream of the breathing bag prevents rebreathing of
 
unrevitalized gas while the breathing bag (17) stores most of the
 
exhaled gas for revitalization and reuse on the next inhalation.
 
The relief valve (18) dumps the excess makeup flow and thus
 
purges the system of nitrogen, some water vapor and some of the
 
exhaled C02. The LiOH canister/cartridge (19) revitalizes the
 
recirculating gas by removing the C02. It contains a wick to
 
retain any moisture which may condense upstream of the cartridge.

The-canister is sealed at both ends prior to use and is pressur­
ized slightly above ambient. The pressure indicator on the can­
ister provides a visual means of verifying that the LiOH has been
 
protected from exposure to a degrading environment during storage.

The check valve (20) at the outlet of the cartridge prevents back
 
flow to the cartridge and thus minimizes the amount of gas which
 
is not revitalized by exposure to the LiOH.
 
4.4 POS Design Review
 
The design of the system was initiated by defining the detail
 
requirements for each component and determining those items
 
for which available commercial and/or aerospace items could be
 
utilized and those which required detail design effort.
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Table 4-4-1 lists the POS components and manufacturers. The de­
sign review in this report is limited to those items designed by
 
Hamilton Standard since design information for the purchased com­
ponents is either proprietary or available from the manufacturer's
 
catalogs.
 
4.4.1 Flow Compensating Orifice
 
The flow compensating orifice is an adjustable device used to
 
match the flow from the 02 reservoir and the breathing bag. The
 
orifice is adjusted after the entire unit is assembled and does
 
not require subsequent adjustment. The device, as shown in
 
Figure 4-4-1, consists of a housing and a threaded poppet and is
 
part of a subassembly which contains the low pressure 02 supply
 
check valve.
 
4.4.2 Mask Assembly
 
The mask used for the POS is a Scott Aviation P/N 27234 mask with
 
deflector which has been modified as shown in Figure 4-4-2. The
 
large opening in the visor is sealed with a plate contaihing two
 
through tubes-. The larger diameter tube is connected by hose to
 
the recirculating portion of the system, while the small diameter
 
tube is connected by hose to the oxygen supply portion of the
 
system. The deflector retains the moist recirculating g&s in the
 
oral/nasal area minimizing fogging due to a.moist gas contact
 
with the visor. The dry makup oxygen is directed by a tube to
 
the top of the visor. The gas enters the facial area through
 
holes in the tube which are oriented such that the incoming gas
 
sweeps across the visor removing any trace of fogging which may
 
exist.
 
4.4.3 Regenerative Heat Exchanger
 
The regenerative heat exchanger assembly (Figure 4-4-3) consists
 
of a lower housing assembly, the body and bed and an upper cover.
 
The lower housing assembly contains the inhalation and exhalation
 
check valves and an actuation lever for the cartridge canister
 
assembly. The body which contains the packed bed is made of tef­
lon to minimize axial heat transfer. The bed consists of small
 
diameter aluminum shot retained at both ends by an aluminum
 
screen. The upper cover contains the duct which connects to the
 
large diameter hose from the mask.
 
4.4.4 Canister/cartridge Assembly
 
The canister/cartridge assembly, Figure 4-4-4, consists of an
 
outer shell with a pressure indicator, a LiOH cartridge,'a cover/
 
wick assembly, and an inlet and an outlet poppet..
 
34 
HAMILTON STANDARD
 
TABLE 4-4-1
 
POS COMPONENTS LIST
 
Name Manufacturer 
02 Bottle Hoke 
Bottle Pressure Gage Kratos 
Interstage Pressure Gage Kratos 
02 Shutoff Valve Carleton Controls 
Pressure Reducer Carleton Controls 
Demand Regulator Carleton Controls 
Exhalation Relief Valve Carleton Controls 
High Pressure Check Valve Circle Seal 
High Pressure Relief Valve Circle Seal 
Breathing Bag Ohio Medical 
02 Reservoir Ohio Medical 
02 Check Valve Ohio Medical 
Inhalation and Exhalation Sierra Eng. 
Check Valve 
Fill Fitting (GFE) Snap Tite 
Flow Limiting Orifice Lee 
Flow Compensating Orifice Hamilton Standard 
Mask Assembly Hamilton Standard 

Regenerative Hx Hamilton Standard 

Canister Cartridge Assembly Hamilton Standard 

Manufacturer's
 
Part Number
 
4HSM95
 
G-6327-4000
 
G-6418-l00
 
1970 090-M2-0014
 
2192-003-3
 
1601002-11
 
1800001-1
 
C220A-1Q
 
D524A-6D-75
 
211-2808-800
 
307-5041-800
 
211-1450-300
 
-Ring 798-05
 
Flapper 798-06
 
4599-220
 
JeTA 1872460
 
SVSK 90391-101
 
SVSK 90391-105
 
SVSK 90486
 
SVSK 90395
 
SVSK 90387
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The outer shell of the canister is constructed of aluminum coated
 
with black anodize to maximize radiative cooling. The pressure
 
indicator which consists of a cover, spring, poppet, and rubber
 
disc is located on the side of the canister. When the pressure
 
inside the canister exceeds 3.4 KPa (0.5 psi), the side of the
 
indicator pin is visible. When the cartridge is installed in the
 
canister, the assembly is charged to 13.8 KPa (2 psi) with oxygen.
 
The indicator pin-provides a visual means of verifying that the
 
pressure in the canister is in excess of 3.4 KPa (0.5 psi) and
 
thus assuring that the LiOH has not been exposed to degrading
 
environments such as water vapor or C02.
 
The LiOH cartridge consists of an aluminum shell with the inner
 
and outer cylinders made of perferated stock, a filter bag assem­
bly made of teflon and nomex nylon felt and a 0.5 Kg (1.1 lb)
 
charge of MIL-L-20213 LiOH. Gas flow enters at the inside tube,
 
flows radially through the LiOH, and exits through the filter and
 
outer tube.
 
The bottom cover -of the canister contains a dacron -wick which
 
traps any water which may condense and be carried to the canis­
ter/cartridge assembly. The inlet and outlet poppet seal the
 
canister and retain the pressure during storage. These poppets
 
are connected by a rod and are opened when engaged with the ac­
tivation lever located in the regenerative heat exchanger.
 
4.4.5 Packaging
 
The basic structure for the POS is a mounting panel assembly made
 
of sheet fiberglass and aluminum angles.
 
Figure 4-4-5 shows the -mounting panel and shows where the various
 
'subassemblies are mounted. The controls and pressure gages are
 
located on the top of the unit, while the canister pressure -indi­
cator is visible from the side of the POS.
 
As shown in Figure 4-4-6, all components are protected by an
 
aluminum cover which contains a large door to permit ea~y access
 
to the stowed mask. The basic cover is blue anodized, And the
 
perferated plate in the canister area is painted black to maxi­
mize radiative cooling of the cover. The interior of the cover
 
in .the area of the canister is coated with gold to-minimize the
 
amount of heat absorbed by the cover. The assembly is provided
 
with adjustable harnesses. The upper harness passes behind the
 
crewman's neck while the lower harness passes around th6 crew­
man's waist to secure the system in front of the crewman.
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The packaging effort also included the identification of limited
 
life items and preparation of a Limited Life List. The list,
 
SVHS 7016, is included in Appendix D.
 
4.5 Fabrication and Acceptance Test
 
The various purchased and in-house designed components and pack­
aging hardware were assembled in accordance with drawing SVSK
 
90390. All operations were completed in work stations compatible
 
with the cleanliness requirements of the system in accordance
 
with step by step assembly procedures with inspection verifica­
tion as required. During the assembly of the unit, some minor
 
reworking was required to eliminate interferences and to improve
 
the operation of the hardware. All drawings were updated to re­
flect the final hardware configuration.
 
The completed unit, less cover and pressure gages, is shown in
 
Figure 4-5-1, while the unit with the cover installed is shown in
 
Figure 4-5-2. The pressure gages were not included in the ini­
tial assembly as they were long lead items and were not available
 
by the time the remainder of the unit was assembled. It was mu­
tually agreed that the unmanned and manned testing could be com­
pleted without the gages provided the gages were installed prior
 
to shipment. The completed assembly was subjected to the accep­
tance test procedures defined by PDA 7015 to demonstrate compli­
ance with the Acceptance Test Plan Specification SVHS 7015, both
 
of which are included in Appendix E. The detail test results are
 
included in the acceptance data package shipped with the hardware.
 
The initial acceptance testing consisted of the following tests:
 
- Supply Circuit Proof Pressure
 
- Breathing Circuit Proof Pressure
 
- Pressure Reducer Performance
 
- Orifice Performance
 
- Demand Regulator Performance
 
- High Pressure Check Valve Performance
 
- Exhalation Relief Valve Performance
 
- Exhalation/Inhalation Resistance
 
- Exhalation/Inhalation Check Valve Performance
 
- High Pressure Supply External Leakage
 
- Breathing Circuit External Leakage
 
- Cartridge/Canister Performance
 
Subsequent to receipt and installation of the pressure gages, the
 
unit was subjected to the supply circuit proof pressure, gage
 
performance, and the high pressure supply external leakage tests.
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During the breathing circuit proof pressure tests, some leaks
 
were detected in various weld joints. These leaks were elimin­
ated by coating the welds with epoxy (EA934).
 
The demand regulator required a deeper vacuum than specified to
 
provide the required flow as shown in Figure 4-5-3.
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Demand Regulator Performance
 
In the prototype POS, the demand regulator outlet port and sensing
 
port are manifolded to a common line. As a result of pressure
 
drop through the line, the sensing port pressure is higher than
 
the mask pressure, thus to obtain a pressure of -1.12 KPa (-4.5
 
in H20) at the sensing port, the mask pressure must be approxi­
mately -1.62 KPa (-6.5 in H20).
 
This problem could be corrected by separating the sensing and
 
outlet lines to eliminate the effects of pressure drop. It was
 
mutually agreed that no change was required in the prototype unit
 
since the demand function could be demonstrated.
 
46
 
4.5 (Continued)
 
The check valve located between the LiOH cartridge and the regen­
erative heat exchanger was found to be leaking at a rate of 461
 
cc/min versus a requirement of 25 cc/min. Examination of the
 
valve upon removal from the system revealed that the rubber flap­
per was distorted which prevented it from sealing. This distor­
tion resulted from the flapper being packaged in an evacuated
 
plastic bag when shipped from the manufacturer. The manufactur­
er was notified and will revise packaging procedures to preclude
 
recurrence of this problem. The distortion of the flapper was
 
eliminated by thermal soaking of the valve for two hours at a
 
temperature of 177*C (3500F). The valve was reinstalled in the
 
system, and the leakage test was completed with the leakage being
 
only 11 cc/min.
 
In the high pressure leakage test, the check valve in the supply
 
line leaked at a rate of 2.5 scc/min versus a limit of 2 scc/hr,
 
and various fittings in the high pressure system were found to
 
be leaking. It was agreed that the performance of the check valve
 
was acceptable and that the requirement was too stringent. After
 
retorquing of the leaking fittings, all high pressure leaks were
 
eliminated except for two "MS" type flareless fittings located
 
upstream of the shutoff valve. These fittings were replaced when
 
the gages were installed and were found to be leak tight during
 
subsequent testing.
 
4.6 Unmanned and Manned Performance Testing
 
Upon completion of acceptance testing (less pressure gages), the
 
unit was subjected to the unmanned tests defined by Test Proce­
dure POS-P-l and to the manned tests defined by Test Procedure
 
POS P-2. These test procedures are included in Appendix F.
 
4.6.1 Unmmaned Test
 
The unmanned performance tests consisted of one run which simu­
lated IV operation, and one run which simulated rescue operation.
 
The test setup utilized is shown in Figure 4-6-1. The instru­
mentation includes dew pointers, C02, 02, and N2 gas analyzers,
 
a temperature recorder, pressure gages, and water manometers set
 
up in accordance with Test Procedure POS-P-l. The POS mask was
 
mounted on a styrofoam wig "head" which was in turn connected to
 
the breathing machine shown in Figure 4-6-2. The breathing ma­
chine consists of a bellows, a small plenum, and a variable speed
 
motor. The linkage connecting the motor to the bellows is ad­
justable so the stroke can be varied. During the test, the speed
 
and stroke were adjusted in accordance with the test procedure to
 
simulate the various work rates. Metabolic C02 was added to the
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system by supplying a mixture of CO2 and 02 to the unit at the 02
 
supply line. The canister area of the system was sealed in a
 
wrap of clear plastic to prevent convective cooling, thus, the
 
temperatures recorded during this test program are representative
 
of those that would be experienced during zero ,g' operations.
 
The simulated IV test consisted of operating at simulated rates
 
of 235 watts (800 Btu/hr) for two hours and 42 minutes, 323 watts
 
(1,100 Btu/hr) for 15 minutes, 440 watts (1,500 Btu/hr) for three
 
minutes, and then 235 watts (800 Btu/hr) until the cartridge out­
let C02 partial pressure exceeded 1.01 KPa (7.6 mm Hg). The run
 
lasted three hours and 30 minutes. The gas mixtures purchased
 
for this test had CO2 concentations greater than those defined in
 
the test procedure and were delivered too late to allow replace­
ment with the proper mixture so the loads imposed were greater
 
than required as summaried in Table 4-6-1.
 
Desired Actual
 
Metabolic Load % C02 % CO2 Metabolic Load
 
Watts (Btu/Hr) Watts (Btu/Hr)
 
235 (800) 24.35 27.5 265 (903)
 
323 (1,100) 34 36.5 345 (1,177)
 
440 (1,500) 47.93 52.1 478 (1,630)
 
Table 4-6-1
 
Gas Mixture Summary
 
The unit met all requirements of the Work Statement as shown in
 
the data plots included in Figures 4-6-3 through 4-6-11. Figure
 
4-6-3 is a plot of cartridge inlet and outlet CO2 partial pres­
sure. The cartridge outlet partial pressure was below the re­
quired limits for the required three hours. Figure 4-6-4 is a
 
plot of N2 concentration versus time. The plot has been correct­
ed to account for instrumentation response time. Figure 4-6-5 is
 
a plot of 02 concentration versus time and is included for infor­
mation. Figure 4-6-6 shows the temperature of the 02 and breath­
ing circuit gas entering the mask and the resultant temperature
 
within the mask. The mask temperature is influenced by both the
 
temperature of the gas in the POS and within the bellows. During
 
the first 80 minutes of operation, the bellows gas temperature
 
was higher than the mask inlet temperature resulting in the tem­
perature in the mask being higher than the temperature of the gas

being returned from the POS. Figure 4-6-7 shows the dew point of
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the gas leaving the cartridge and within the mask. The dew point
 
within the mask is a resultant of the dew point in the bellows
 
which was maintained at approximately 37.8*C (1000F), the dew
 
point of the gas returning from the POS and the dew point of the
 
makeup gas.
 
Figure 4-6-8 is a plot of the canister which is radiating heat
 
from the unit and of the cover and grid which can be touched by

the crewman. As shown in the Figure, the touch temperatures were
 
well below the 450C (1131F) allowable. Figures 4-6-9 and 4-6-10
 
provide temperature data at various locations within the system.

There are no required limits for these data points. Figure

4-6-11 is a summary of the inhalation and exhalation resistance
 
taken within the mask. During this test, two gas samples were
 
obtained for verification that the unit was safe for manned use.
 
The first sample was taken at 160 minutes of operation, and the
 
second was taken at 175 minutes of operation. The samples were
 
analyzed and were found to be free of harmful concentrations of
 
toxic materials.
 
The simulated rescue mission consisted of a two hour denitrogeni­
zation at a work rate of 176 watts (600 Btu/hr) followed by a one
 
hour simulation of operation in the rescue enclosure at a work
 
rate of 235 watts (800 Btu/hr). During the one hour simulated
 
rescue, the flow was reduced to simulate the LiOH cooling that
 
would occur during zero 'g' operation in the rescue enclosure so
 
the temperatures obtained are equivalent to those that would be
 
experienced in an actual zero 'g' rescue operation.
 
As in the previous test, the C02 concentrations were slightly

higher than required as summarized in Table 4-6-2.
 
Desired Actual
 
Metabolic Load % C02 Metabolic Load
% CO2 

Watts (Btu/Hr) Watts (Btu/Hr)
 
176 (600) 18 19.7 192 (656)

235 (800) 28.72 31.9 260 (886)
 
Table 4-6-2
 
At these slightly higher metabolic loads, the unit lasted well in
 
excess ( 33%) of the three hours minimum duration. The data from
 
the test is presented in Figures 4-6-12 through 4-6-20. The test
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was terminated after four hours and forty-five minutes of opera­tion. 
The data collected was clearly sufficient tO demonstrate
the acceptability of the unit for this mode of operation. 
Gas
samples were collected at 160 and 190 minutes of operation, and
their analysis showed no harmful concentrations of toxic materials.
 
The two unmanned test runs confirmed that the unit was safe for
manned test use and demonstrated that the unit complied with Wor

Statement requirements.
 
4.6.2 Manned Test
 
The manned test utilized much of the test setup used for the un­manned test, except that the breathing machine and 02/CO 2 mix­tures were replaced by a test subject who walked on a tread mill
to obtain the desired-work rate. The subject and test setup are
shown in Figure 4-6-21. 
The test setup used is shown in Test
Procedure POS-P-2, except that there was no instrumentation lo
cated in the mask. 
This change was made to eliminate a possible
leak path in the mask seal. The N2 and 02 analyzers were con­nected in series with the cartridge inlet CO2 analyzer, and the
mask dew pointer and pressure gage were connected to the hose
between the POS and the mask. 
In addition, the manometer was
replaced by a pressure transducer in order to obtain a pressure
reading free from the dynamic effects of'constantly changing

pressure.
 
A total of four manned tests were conducted. The first two were
of short duration due to the subject working at work rates in ex­cess of the specified levels. 
Only the final two tests which wer,
conducted in accordance with the test procedure will be discussed
 
in this report.
 
The first manned test conducted per the test procedure was simi­lar to the initial unmanned test, while the second test was a
steady state test conducted to supplement the data obtained
during the first test. 
The day before the first run, the meta­bolic calibration of the subject was performed providihg metabol­ic rate versus heart rate and tread mill rate.
 
Prior to the performance run, the subject conducted the applic­able portions of the preuse check-out procedure defined in the
test procedure (pressure gages were not in unit and thus could

not be checked). This test verified that a crewman can check
the operation of the exhalation check valve, the exhlation re­lief valve, and of the demand regulator. The subject was unable
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to feel the normal makeup flow so this approach cannot be util­
ized for verifying the presence of makeup flow during a flight
 
preuse check-out. It was noted that the makeup flow can be heard
 
so it is possible for a crewman to verify makeup flow by listen­
ing to the system once the 02 supply is connected. As an alter­
nate, the crewman could exhale on the center of the visor and
 
verify the presence of makeup flow when the fog clears.
 
The 	tests were conducted in the following sequence:
 
a) 	The N2, 02, and C02 analyzers were calibrated.
 
b) 	Proper function of other instruments verified.
 
c) 	Bioinstrumentation attached to test subject and heart rate
 
readout verified.
 
d) 	Subject mounted tread mill.
 
e) 	System gas supply charged with 02.
 
f) 	Subject donned mask using demand regulator for inhalation.
 
g) 	When subject could feel no leaks in face seal, the car­
tridge was activated, the timer started, the 02 bottle
 
weight recorded, and the demand regulator outlet tube was
 
clamped shut to prevent actuation during the run.
 
h) 	The subject started walking at the prescribed rate.
 
This procedure provided for a rapid purge of the nitrogen in the
 
system and if used in a contaminated cabin would rapidly remove
 
any 	contaminates from the system prior to opening the canister,

thus preventing any deleterious effect on the LiOH.
 
In the simulated IV operation run, the subject inhaled seven
 
times from the demand regulator before the cartridge was acti­
vated. After the cartridge was activated, subject commenced
 
walking at a speed equivalent to a metabolic rate of 235 watts
 (800 Btu/hr). After about 15 minutes of operation, the heart
 
rate stabilized at the level obtained during the calibration.
 
As the run progressed, the heart rate started to climb indicating
 
a higher work rate; thus, it was elected to slow the tread mill
 
as required to maintain a constant heart rate. The subject

worked at the 235 watt (800 Btu/hr) level for two hours and forty

four minutes and then increased speed to the level equivalent to
 
323 	watts (1,100 Btu/hr) and maintained this level for 15.5
 
minutes. The tread mill was then increased to represent a rate
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of 440 watts (1,500 Btu/hr). 
 This rate was maintained for three
minutes after which the subject slowed to the tread mill speed
equivalent to 235 watt (800 Btu/hr) rate. 
He continued to work
at this rate until the cartridge outlet partial pressure exceeded
1.01 KPa 
(7.6 mm Hg). It was observed that the tread mill speed
and heart rate did not correlate with the data obtained during
calibration. 
Based on heart rate, the actual work rates were as

summarized in Table 4-6-3.
 
Desired Work Rate 
 Work Rate Based on Heart Beats/Min
 
323 Watts (1,100 Btu/Hr) @ 0 - 9-Min 
 346 Watts (1,180 Btu/Hr)
 
@ 13 Min 366 Watts (1,250 Btu/Hr)

@ 15 Min 422 Watts (1,440 Btu/Hr)
 
440 Watts (1,500 Btu/Hr) 
 492 Watts (1,680 Btu/Hr)
 
235 Watts (800 Btu/Hr) @ 2 Min 
 323 Watts (1,100 Btu/Hr)
(After Work Spike) 
 @ 12 & 20 Min 293 Watts (1,000 Btu/Hr)
 
Table 4-6-3
Actual Work Rates Versus Desired Work Rates
 
The actual C02 absorbed by the bed, based on a chemical analysis,
correlated with the amount predicted based on the actual work
 
rates observed.
 
Upon reaching the 1.01 KPa (7.6 mm Hg) level, the mask was 
re­moved from the subject, and the 02 supply was shut off. 
 Immedi-­ately after the run, a metabolic gas sample was collected and
analyzed with the subject walking at a rate lower than used
during the test. 
The analysis indicated that the subject was
working at 337 watts 
(1,150 Btu/hr).
 
About 10 minutes prior to the high work rates, the subject re­ported that he thought the breathing bag was bottoming although
the system was providing his inhalation deiands. 
To prevent
breathing difficulty during the high work rates, the clamp iso­lating the demand regulator was removed. 
Atthe high work rate,
the demand regulator was activated six times although the subject
only was aware of two activations, and based on hearing flow,
there were only two periods of significant flow through the
demand regulator.
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When the crewman reported that he thought the breathing bag was
 
bottoming, it was observed that the breathing bag was not fully

inflating and that the exhalation pressure was significantly

lower than at other times during the run. It was suspected that
 
this shift in performance was due to water collecting on the ex­
halation relief valve causing its setting to change. 
This was
 
supported by observing a large quantity of water expelled from
 
the valve during the high work rates. After the water was exp­
pelled, the exhalation pressure returned to normal, and the sub­ject did not report feeling the bag bottom during the remainder
 
of the test.
 
The data collected during this run is summarized in Figures

4-6-22 through 4-6-30. The unit met all requirements of the
 
Work Statement. 
It was noted that the inhalation resistance was
higher than predicted and tended to climb as the run progressed.

This phenomina was further evaluated during the final manned test
 
and will be discussed in the review of that test.
 
Prior to initiation of the final manned test, water manometers,
 
were connected to the unit to determine the pressure drop between
 
thebreathing bag and canister outlet and between the canister
 
outlet and the mask inlet to permit further evaluation of the
higher predicted inhalation resistance observed during the first
 
test.
 
The final test was initiated following the same procedure as for
 
the previous test. The subject took slightly longer to adjust

the mask and assure that he could feel no leaks, thus, the demand

regulator was activated twelve times prior to opening the canister.
 
The subject started walking at the same rate as used at the be­
ginning of the previous run. Unlike the previous test, the sub­ject's heart rate did not increase, so in an attempt to make the
 
heart rate increase, the subject's speed was increased. After
 
thirty minutes, the subject reported that he was working harder
 
than he did during rhe previous run. The inhalation resistance
 
was also high, indicating a high work rate, and the LibH car­
tridge outlet CO2 partial pressure showed a slight but premature
increase. The subject's walking rate was decreased below the 235.
 
watts (800 But/hr) rate to compensate for the high work rate.
 
The subject's heart rate finally approached the level maintained
 
during the previous run. The subject increased speed slightly to
 
the speed maintained through most of the other test. 
This speed

was then maintained for the remainder of the test even though the
 
subject's heart rate did climb slightly (-17.6watts 
(60 Btu/hr)).

The cartridge outlet pressure exceeded 1.01 KPa (7.6 mm Hg) after
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4.6.2 (continued)
 
187 minutes of operation, however, the test was not terminated
 
until 240 minutes in order to gain a second test point for review
 
of LiOH performance. The chemical analysis of the cartridge con­
firmed that the subject had worked at a rate equal to or slightly
 
above an average of 235 watts (800 Btu/hr). The data from this
 
test is shown in Figures 4-6-31 through 4-3-39.
 
After about 160 minutes of operation, the subject reported feel­
ing as though the bag was collapsing but was able to continue
 
without the demand regulator by changing his breathing cycle. As
 
before, the exhalation pressure had dropped, and the bag did not
 
appear to fully inflate. After 190 minutes of operation, the
 
clamp isolating the demand regulator was removed, and the sub­
ject, as directed, exhaled sharply blowing water from the relief
 
valve. This was repeated about five times. The subject did re­
quire the demand regulator several times while blowing water from
 
the system. Once the water was blown out of the system, the sub­
ject did not bottom 	the breathing bag or use the demand regulator

for the remainder of the run. This confirmed that water buildup
 
on the valve was affecting its performance. This situation would
 
not occur in 0 yg' operation and could be eliminated in subsequent

units by locating the valve vertically with respect to gravity in­
stead of horizontally as in the prototype system.
 
The system steady state inhalation resistance was determined to
 
assist in evaluation of the higher than expected inhalation re­
sistance observed during the manned test. This information is
 
provided in Figure 4-6-40. At the peak flow used for-designing

the system, the inhalation resistance was as had been predicted,

thus indicating that the peak flow was higher than used in the
 
design of the system. The actual flow experienced during the
 
manned tests were estimated using the LiOH canister inlet CO2
 
level and inlet an& outlet temperatures assuming that the work
 
rate was 235 watts 	(800 Btu/hr). Using the resistance versus
 
peak flow data shown in Figure 4-6-40, the estimated resistance
 
versus time was established. This is shown in Figures 4-6-41 and
 
4-5-42 which show the inhalation resistance versus test duration
 
for the first and second tests respectively. These Figures are
 
composites showing the originally estimated resistance, the esti­
mated resistance b&sed on C02 level, the high and low limits of
 
the actual inhalation resistance, and inhalation resistance re­
corded most often during the test. The proximity of the actual
 
resistance and the resistance estimated from the C02 ldvel con­
firms that the subject was ventilating at a higher rate than used
 
in the system design. This wasdue in part to the subject's nor­
mal breathing pattern. A number of factors influence the differ­
ence between the actual resistance and the estimated resistance
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4.6.2 (Continued) 
based on C02 level. These include a) subjects breathing pattern

(peak levels shown at 25 and 60 minutes on Figure 4-6-41 resulted
 
from 2 to 3 short deep breaths, whereas most other inhalations
 
were of longer duration); b) subjects work rate (estimated resis­
tance based on C02 level assumes 235 watts (800 Btu/hr) work rate,

higher work rate would decrease estimated resistance); c) water
 
collection in regenerative heat exchanger (it is estimated that­
the bed collects about 10 cc of water which contributes - 50 Pa (.2 in H20) to breathing resistance; and d) breathing bag bottom­
ing (late in run, subject reported feeling the bag bottom - this
 
supported by inhalation resistance pattern for peak levels ex­
perienced). The number of variables which occur during manned
 
test make it impossible to isolate and quantify factors influenc­
ing the results of the test. As a result of this test series, ii
 
is apparent that unmanned testing is mandatory to allow control
 
of the variables'in order to properly engineer a system of this
 
type.
 
From review of the system test results and system design, it is
 
believed that a system of this type could be designed to operate

with an inhalation resistance of 373 Pa ( 1.5 in H20) at a work
 
rate of 235 watts (800 Btu/hr). Attempting to achieve this re­
sistance level at higher work rates would impose significant

penalties on the system not believed justified because of the
 
short operation of durations at the higher work rates.
 
The prototype POS, provided under this contract, meets the re­
quirements of the Work Statement and is suitable for further
 
unmanned and manned testing.
 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
 
The POS program has defined a breathing system usable for deni­
trogenization, emergency intravehicular operation and for emer­
gency rescue operation. The system meets the Space Shuttle
 
objectives of low cost, minimum maintenance, long life, low
 
weight, and low volume. The POS evolved during this contract is
 
also simple, reliable, and easy to operate. The prototype por­
table oxygen subsystem fabricated and tested during this program
 
meets the requirements of the Work Statement and is suitable for
 
additional manned and unmanned testing.
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POS ANALYTICAL MODEL
 
SUMMARY 
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HAMILTON STANDARD 0t"' 
POS ANALYTICAL MODEL SUMMARY
 
The P0S was modeled using a combination of the IBM Continuous
 
System Modeling Program (CSMP) and Fortran IV and is operational
 
on Hamilton Standard IBM 370 computer.
 
The basic nodes, shown in Figure A-i, were utilized to describe
 
the various components of the system. There was also a regenera­
tive heat exchanger subroutine to subdivide this component into
 
any desired number of sections.
 
Each node is convectively linked to the internal gas and (in one
 
"g") the external environment. Operation in one "g" and zero "g"

are simulated by changing the convective heat transfer coeffic­
ient. Radiation to the environment is considered as is radiative
 
transfer between the LiOH cartridge O.D. and the canister which
 
serves as the outer radiator. Conduction between the LiOH chemi­
cal bed and the outer containment is also considered.
 
Mathematically, each inhalation or exhalation is treated as a
 
separate transient with initial conditions taken from the pre­
vious breath. With a breathing rate of 15 breaths per minute,
 
or two seconds per inhalation and two seconds per exhalation, a
 
total of 1,800 transient solutions are obtained for each hour of
 
real time run. A total of 136 output variables are available at
 
a frequency of up to five times per inhalation or exhalation.
 
Management of this volume of data would be 'at best a difficult
 
task if normal computer print out were utilized. This has been
 
eased by storing all run output on tape. Either print or plot
 
output may be recalled for any desired parameters or time frame
 
and in frequency required as shown by the sample plots shown in
 
Figure A-2 through A-7. The program flow chart is shown starting
 
on page A-9.
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PROGRAM NOMENCLATURE 
Cij - THERMAL CONDUCTIVE CONDUCTANCE BETWEEN NODES i AND j 
Dij - RADIATION CONDUCTANCE BETWEEN NODES i AND j 
CGAS i - CONVECTIVE CONDUCTANCE BETWEEN FLOWINGGAS AND NODE i 
CAMB i - CONVECTIVE CONDUCTANCE.BETWEEN NODE i AND AMBIENT 
DAMB i - RADIATIVE CONDUCTANCE BETWEEN NODE i AND AMBIENT 
i - INTERNAL HEAT GENERATION IN NODE i 
ZM - NODAL THERMAL MASS 
PH2OZO - HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET CONDITION DURING INHALATION 
PH2OXO - HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET CONDITION DURING EXHALATION 
PH2OMO - MAN OUTLET CONDITION 
PH2OLO - LiOH OUTLET CONDITION 
Z - HEAT EXCHANGER EFFECTIVENESS 
KANDK - STEAM TABLE SUBROUTINE 
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OUTPUT VARIABLES. 
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SECTION TEMPERATURE 
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GAS TEMPERATURE OUT 
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CONSUMi = 
n 
> 
j=1 
l 
Cij (Tj-T i) 
RADSUM i = 
n 
j~i 
Dij (iTj4 -Ti4 ) 
TGTRYG= CGASI (TGAS15) 
TGTRoTGTRY(3)= (6) = 0 
TGTRY (7) = 0. 
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dT= 
dt 
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+ TGTRY i + Qi] /ZM iI 
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HAMILTON STANDARD 0 a 
CGAS =f, (WH20MO, WO2MO, WCO2MO)' 
TGAS (1) = f 2 (TGAS (11)) 
TGAS (2) = f2 (TGAS (1)) 
I 
GET TGAS (9), PH2OXO, WH2OXO 
dM/dt, dTHX/d t, PCO2XO, PO2XO 
FROM REGEN SUBROUTINE 
I 
CGAS = f1 (WH2OXO, WO2MO, WCO2MO)
 
TGAS (3) = f 2 (TGAS (9))
 
TGAS (4) = f2 (TGAS (3))
I 
RATES OF CHANGE OF MASS IN BAG 
dH2 0/dt = WH2OXO 
d O2 /dt = WO2MO 
d C0 2 /dt = WCO2MO 
dN/dt 
WDOT = WH2OXO/18 + WCO2MO/44 + W02MO/32 
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D1/HAMILTON STANDARD 
SFLOW OFO02 OUT OF-BAG (SIGNED) 
dO2 /dt = -WO2MO - 0.808 WCO2MO + WO2MKP 
PART PRESSURES IN BAG 
555 TGAS (4) M02P02 BAG -=______ 
VOL 32 
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TGAS (5) = f2 (TGAS (8)) 
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dN/dt 
WDOT- dH20 /18 + /32 + - /dO2 dCO 2
 
dt dt dt 
]I dc°27)tQ(5) = 827 (- dt ) 
FLOWS OUT OF LiOH 
WO2LO = -dO 2/dt 
WH2OLO =- dH2 0/dt - dCO 2 /dt 1 1 
WCO2LO = 0 
I 
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TGAS (6) = f 2 (TGAS (5)) 
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dV'dt = (K) (R) (TGAS (4)) (WOOT) 
2(VOL) + 56.24 
[YES 
dP/di 0
 
dH 2 0/dt = 0
 
dO2 /dt = 0
 
dCO2 /dt = 0
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W TECHMOLOGIES 
REGENERATOR (REPEAT FOR EACH NODE) 
TOUT = E(THx-TIN)+TIN 
SPH20 = f (T O U T ) K AND K 
(PH20) (V) 8( 
WH20 (555) (TouT) 
d t H O N - H 0 I M2M dM 
- =dt < 0, THEN 
dM 
­ 0 & PH20 = f (T 
ddt
 
dt ( o25 ) (0 2TOUT T N 1 2 ) - - / M ; 
(W0 2 ) (555) (TouT) 
(32) '0 
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MAILTON STANDARD ' 
f= WH20 (0.45) + W02 (0.22) + WCO2MO (0.22) 
(CGAS) (TGASIN)f (CGASI) (Ti) + CGASI i + CAS 
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CRITICAL ITEM LIST
 
SAFETY STUDY AND HAZARD ANALYSIS
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HAMILTON-STANDARD A" of 
GROUNDRULES FOR FMEA/CIL
 
This FMECA is organized to meet the POS Statement of Work, para­
graph 7E(2) and DRL Item 9, 338T. The criticalities are:
 
1. Loss of life or vehicle
 
2. Aborted or scrubbed mission
 
3. All others
 
It is reasoned that failure of a POS cannot cause a scrubbed mis­
sion since the failed unit could be replaced during launch pre­
paration. Further, a failed POS cannot result in aborting a POS
 
mission because at any time prior to Independent Rescue Operation

the spare POS can be substituted, and because it is not possible
 
to abort a committed Independent Rescue Operation. Accordingly,
 
criticalities appearing in the analysis are either (1) or (3).
 
Consideration should be given to placing a spare POS on each deck.
 
If this were done, quick access to a spare POS in the event of
 
failure during Independent IV may decrease the criticality of
 
numerous failure modes.
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- FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
 
SYSTEM: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
ASSEMBLY: 
MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE 
POS PREPARED BY: 
APPROVED BY: 
PAGE 1 OF 9 
DATE 
SUPERSEDING 
IV 
' 
R________ 
NAEAND 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
_______ 
ID NO. 
ITEM NO. FUNCTION 
FAILURE MODE 
AND CAUSE 
MISSION 
.PHASE ASSEMBLY SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM 
FAILURE 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
TIME 
AVAIL 
FAIL 
CORRECTIVE MODE 
ACTION CHIT REV 
f 
02 
Bottle 
(1) 
storage Rupture due 
for indepen- to flaw or 
dent POS overheatihg.
operation. 
Storage 
Denitrogen-
ization
"independentIVOation 
Loss of 
function. 
" 
Loss of 
function, 
Loss of 
function. 
Visual obser-
vation of 
pressure gage 
or none, 
Yes 
No 
-gNo 
Use spare 
POS. 
None 
- R on None 
3 
1 
1- -
Inepenent FNo None. 
Rescue 
Leakage due 
to flaw. 
Operation
Recharge 
in Vehicle 
Storage 
IF " Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Use spare
P0S.Use spare
POS. 
3 
3 
Denitrogen-
ization 
Yes 
-Ye-s 
Use spare 
U p0a. 
Independent PNOone-go-rgo ­ 1 
IV Operation 
Independent 
Rescue 
" Note Special 
1 breathing 
1 
Operation
Rechairge 
Vehicle 
n 
No 
Yes 
procedure.
Use spare 
POS. 
3 
Note 1: In those cases here special breathing proce ure is feasibl the e is sufficient 
tim to employ. 
Pressure, onitor hot- Rupture due 
Gage (2) tle pressure'to flaw or 
overheating. 
Storage 5oss of func Ioss of funcLoss of func-
:ion and tion and ' tion and 
3tored 02. stored 02. stored 02. 
Visual obser-
v&tion of 
pressure gage 
Yes Use spare 
POS. 
3 
-or none. 
Denltrogen- No None 
ization 
Independent
_IV Operation NNo on1 
Independent 
"No' None 
RescueOperation ' 
Recharge in 
Vehicle Yes Use spare POS. 
3 
_______________ 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
 
SYSTEM: 
 MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE

SUBSYSTEM: POS 
 PAGE 2 OF
 
ASSEMBLY: 	 PREPARED BY: DATE
 
APPROVED BY: 
 SUPERSEDING
 
NAME AND= 	 O
NAME-AND___ 
__ FAILURE EFFECT ON_ FAILURE 	 AF R IL 	 FAIL­o C ID NO. 	 FAILURE MODE MISSION
ITEM NO. FUNCTION AND CAUSE 	 DETECTION TIME CORRECTIVE MODE
PHASE ASSEMBLY SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM 
 METHOD AVAIL ACTION CRI REVt C 	 Pressure Leakage due Storage Loss of Loss ofC) Gage (2) to flaw. 	 Loss of funo- Visual obser- Yes Use spare 3
function anfunction and tion and stored vation of 
 POS.
 (Cont'd) 
 stored 02. stored 02. 02. 
 pressure gage
 
inton 
 none.
-5-eitroen-or 
 Yes Use spare 
­
ization 
P____________Independent 	 OS.
 IV Operatior NO None 1 
Indpendent " ' 	 Note Specialm Rescue	 1Operation 	 " No 	 breathing
 
procedure.
Seat
Rec arge in 

""Yes
Vehicle ' 	 Use spare 3POs.
Moemnt St-orage Lfosso Lso of o - -No-ne Yes None re­
w sticks. function. function. function. quired. 
Top the
 
Denitrogen- _ffe,,t~qe,-gage.
 
"'Yes 
 3
3Yes 

ization 

Independent 
 Visual obser- Yes 	 3
IV 0 eration 
 vation of gage
MIndependent 
 Yes " , 3

Rescue
 
Operation

Recharge in 
 Y-

Vehicle
02 Isolates Cannot be Recharge 
 Crew obser- Yes Use spare 3Shutoff bottle dur- closed due to 
 vation.
Valve 	 POS.
ing storage jamming. Independent 	 Y 
 use spare
(3) 	 and while IV Operation

using Cannot Fe Recharge POS.
 Yes 	 Use spare 3vehicle 02. opended due 

POS Ipar
to jamming. Independent 
 No 	 None I
 
IV Operation 
_Independent Note: Valv- to be opene 
before 	 rcomitt ng to transfer. yes Use spare 3
Rescue 
 POS.
 
Operation
External leak Storage 	 PUS.
 Pressure Gage "Tes. Use spare 3_T ­due to hous-
ing defect or Independent 	 POS. No 	 None Iseal malfunc- IV Operation
 
tion. Independent 

"ote Special 
-Rescue 
 1 	 breathing
Operation 
 NQ 	 Procedure.
 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
 
SYSTEM: MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE 
 PAGE 3 OFSUBSYSTEM: P0S PREPARED BY: 
 DATE
ASSEMBLY: APPROVED BY: 
 SUPERSEDING
 
NME AND W_ _ !WD FAILURE EFFECT ON FA ,FAILURE AI
 
ID NO. FAILURE MODE MISSION 
 DETECTION TIME CORRECTIVE MODE
ITEM NO. FUNCTION AND CAUSE 
 PHASE ASSEMBLY SUBSYSTEM 
 SYSTEM - METHOD AVAIL ACTION, CRIT REV 
02 Shut- Seat Leakage Storage Loss of Loss of Loss of Pressure Gage Yes Use spare 3
off Valv 
 function. function. Junction. 
 POS.
 
(3)
 
(Cont'd)

Check Prevent back Fails closed Denitrogen- Won't allow Loss of oss of 
 Crew observa- Yes Use spare 3
Valve flow from due to 
 ization flow topPOS function. function. tion can't in- POS.
(4) POS to vehi- ja qifig. from vehicle Hale and/or

cle 02 Sup-
 02 supply. breathing bag
ply in the 
 does not
 
event POS0 2 

. inflate.shutoff is Fails open Independent Fails to Loss of POS 
 Bottle sized to Bottle pressur Not Not re- 3
left open, due to IV Operation check flow oxygen. orovide 10 min. drops when c6n-eq'd quired.
jamming from POS to ndependent op- nection to ve­
vehicle. aration when hicle 02
 
Iharged to ve- supply.

*idole supply
 
_ _ _ ressure. 
Independent duration"escue 
 Yes Use spare 3-
Rescue imited to 15 POS.U2 v 
___ P rOpei6tion nihutes.
02 is- uonnect iPus £aJ to con- uenltrogen- toss 
 s or urew onserva- Yes use spare ­connect to vehicle nect due to ization function, function, function. tion. 
 POS.
 
(5) 02 supply, jamming or iIndependent. ' Can't re- Yes Use spare. 3
distortion. 
_IV Operation charge bottle 
 POS..
 
Fails to dis- AT en o Cannot be Loss of--
 Yes Use spare 3
connect due denitrogen- disconnectedfunction. 
 POS. Note Th re
to jamming. ization. 
 must be at leas:
 
one extra ,ehicLe
 
connector.
Leakage while Denitrogen- None Requires ex- lxcess use of None in pOS. Yes Use spare 3­connected. ization 
-ess vehicle 
ehicle 02. -Rate of vehicle POS. 
_ 02. 02 use.Leakage while'Independent None 5oss of leduced dura- FOS pressure *No If detect2 1
disconnected. IV Operation stored 02. -ion of inde gage or none. 
 ed, use
 
?endent opera- spare POS.
 
:ion.
 
Independent None 

" Tote Special 
Rescue . 
.- 1 breathing.

Operation 
 No procedure.
 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
 
SYSTEM: MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE 
 PAGE 4 OFSUBSYSTEM: POS 
 PREPARED BY: 
 DATE
ASSEMBLY: 
 APPROVED BY: 
 SUPERSEDING
 
NAME AND 
_FAILURE EFFECT ON
 
FAILURE

ID NO. FAILURE MODE MISSION FAIL
DETECTION TIME CORRECTIVE MODE
ITEM NO. FUNCTION 
 AND CAUSE PHASE ASSEMBLY SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM 
 METHOD AVAIL ACTION CRIT REV
 
Pressure Control ori- Fails open Denitrogen- LosS of 
 Loss of Excessive use Interstage Yes Use spare 3
Reducer fice and 
 due to spring ization function, function, of vehicle 02. Pressure Gage
(6) demand regu- failure. Indepdent POS.
 ' Loss of THerstage No None­lator inlet IV Operation function, pressure gage

pressure to 

and bottle
a fixed 
 pressure gage
alue. 
 or none.
 
Independent 
 No None IRescue
 
Regulator Openrtion- Excessive use Interstage Yes 
 se-spare 3
 
above. Set ization 
 of vehicle 02. Pressure,Sage
point or ex- Emergency POS.
Loss Of Interstage NO None

cessive in- IV Operation function. pressure gage

ternal 

and bottle
leakage. 
 pressure gage 
W or none.Rescue EV 
 No Same as 1 
Operation 
 for fail
 
Failed closed Denitrogen- open.
Can't inhale Yes Use spare 3
 
ization 
 and no pressure POS.
 
indication on
 
interstage
 
pressure gage.
Independent 
 No None -
IV Operation

Independent 
 No None 1
 
Rescue
 
Operation

Regulate be- Denitrogen- Higher than Higher than Not Not req'd. 3
low set point ization normal inlet normal inlet Req'd
(flow in ex-
 temperature. gas temp. and
 cess of 
 interstage

metabolic 
 pressure gage

requirement), 
_or 
 none.
Independent 
 Not Not reqd. T 
IV Operation 
 eq'd

and Indepen­
dent Rescue
 
Operation
 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
 
SYSTEM:. 
SUBSYSTEM: 
ASSEMBLY: 
MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE 
P0S PREPARED BY: 
APPROVED BY: 
PAGES OF 
DATE 
SUPERSEDING 
________NME AND _ _ _ _ _ _ _FAILURE EFFECT ON FAILURE FAIL 
ID NO. 
ITEM NO. FUNCTION 
FAILURE MODE 
AND CAUSE 
MISSION 
PHASE ASSEMBLY SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
TIME 
AVAIL 
CORRECTIVE MODE 
ACTION CRIT REV 
Pressure 
Reducer 
(6) 
(Cont'd) 
Flow less Denitrogen-
than metabol- ization 
ic require-
ments. 
Independent 
IV Operation 
and Indepen-
Loss of 
function, 
Loss of 
function, 
Degraded 
performance. 
Interstage 
pressure gage. 
Also breathing 
bag collapses. 
Yes 
No 
Use spare 
POS. 
None 
3 
I­
dent Rescue 
External 
Leakage 
Operation
Denitrogen-
ization 
-None Yes Use spare 
POS. 
3 
Independent
IV Operation Drop in bottle -No pressure or 
None 1 
none. 
High 
Pressure 
Relief 
Valve 
(7) 
Independent 
RescueOperation
?revent over-Opens when it D en-
3ressure of should not or ization 
reathing leaks. Indepndendent 
ircuit in IV Operation 
:he event of 
Loss Of 
function, 
" 
Loss of 
function, 
Excessive use 
vehicle 02. 
'Loss of 
function. 
qote 
No 
None No 
Bottle pressure No 
gage drops or 
none. 
Special 
breathing 
procedure.
Npne 
None 
1 
1 
-
failed ope Independent No None 
?ressure Rescue 
:educer. 
Demand Provide ad- Fails closed 
Regulator ditional 02 due to 
(8) on demand jamming. 
if require-
Operation
Denitrogen-
ization 
"Total collapse 
of breathing 
bag on inhala­
tion. 
Not 
leq'd 
Not reqd. _T 
ment exceed Independent 
" 3 
orifice floA IV Operation 
or Indepen­
dent Rescue 
Operation 
Fails open 
ind leaks 
internally. 
Denitrogen-
ization 
Independent 
IV Operation 
Excess use of 
vehicle 02. 
Loss of 
function, 
None 
1 
Abnormal drop 
in bottle pres­
sure or none. 
No None 
3 
1 
Independent No None 
-
Rescue 
Operation 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
 
SYSTEM: MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE 
 PAGE 6 OF
SUBSYSTEM: POS 
 PREPARED BY: 
 DATE

ASSEMBLY: 
 APPROVED BY: 
 SUPERSEDING
 
-and 

NAME-AND _________FAILURENAME AND EFFECT ON FAILUREF ILURE 
-A~ 
ID NO. 
ITEM NO. FUNCTION 
FAILURE MODE 
AND CAUSE 
MISSION 
PHASE ASSEMBLY SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
TIME 
AVAIL 
CORRECTIVE MODE 
ACTION CUT REV 
Demand 
Regulator 
(8) 
(Cont'd) 
External 
Leakage 
Denitrogen-
tion 
Independent 
IV Operation 
Loss of 
function, 
Loss of 
function, 
Excess use of 
vehicle 09. 
Loss of 
function, 
None 
_eq'd. 
Abnormal drop 
in bottle 
Not 
Yes 
Not req'd. 
Use spare 
POS. 
3 
3 
Orifice 
(9) 
Restrict 02 Clogs 
flow to a 
specified 
Independent 
Rescue 
Operation 
Denitrogen-
ization 
Degraded 
performance. 
pes . 
Breathing bag 
would collapse 
and crewman 
ote 1 Special 
No breathing 
procedure. 
Yes Use spare 
POS. 
1 
3 
range. would have to 
inhale deeply 
to get flow 
through demand 
m regulator. In­let gas temp. 
dewpoint
 
would be higher

than normal.
 
Independent 
 Not Not req'd. 3
IV Operation 
 1eq'd
 
or Indepen­
dent Rescue
 
Operation
 
Flow Store make- Leakage due Denitrogen- Loss of None 
 NO None 1

Compensa- up 02 dur- to tear or ization and 
 function.
 
ting Bag ing exhala- flaw. Independent

(10) tion and 
 IV Operation

supplement Independent. Slightly de- None Not Not req'd. 
 3
 
makeup 02 Rescue graded

during operation function.
 
inhalation.

Flow Control Clogging Denitrogen- Loss of Increase in Not Not reqd. 3
Matching makeup flow ization 
 function. breathing eq'd
Orifice during 
 resistance.
(11) inhalation. Independent 
 3 
IV Operation 
or Indepen­
dent Rescue 
Operation
 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
 
SYSTEM: MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE PAGE 7 OF
 
SUBSYSTEM: POS PREPARED BY: DATE
 
ASSEMBLY: 
 APPROVED BY: 	 SUPERSEDING
 
FAILURE EFFECT ON
 
NAME AND FAILURE FAIL 
ID NO. FAILURE MODE MISSION DETECTION TIME CORRECTIVE MODE 
ITEM NO. FUNCTION AND CAUSE PHASE ASSEMBLY SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM METHOD AVAIL ACTION CRIT REV 
Makeup To prevent Fail closed. 	 Umbrella Tye Valve -.Can ot Fail Closed
 
Flow exhaling Fail open. All" Loss of Slightly Slightly None Not Not req'd. 3
 
Check into flow function. degraded degraded 'eq'd
 
Valve compensatinc performance. performance.
 
(1 2 ) , b a g . - - Cl o_ - -T_ _ _ _ _ 
02 Inlet Supply duct Clogged . o Same as-Itez 9. "- 7 
Hose (13) for mask 02 External leak Denitrogen- Loss of Loss of' Lossof Breathing bag NO None 1 
ization and function. 	 function, function. would collapse.
 
Independent
 
IV Operation

Independent 	 Degraded Degraded None Not Not req'd. 3
 
Rescue 	 performance, performance. Req'd
Operatioin 
______ 
Mask (14) Isolates Leakage Denitrogen- -LOSS of Loss of None No None I 
eyes and ization and function. functi6n. 
oral/nasal Independent 
area from IV Operation , • 
ambient. 	 Independent Degraded Degraded None Not Not req'd. -
Rescue performance. performance. Req'd 
Operation 
02.inlet line 	 Same as Item 9.
 
clogged.
 
Breathing Connect mas External Same as Face Mask Item 14
 
Hose (15) with recir- Leakage
 
culating
 
portion of
 
the'system. Sa e-4a __-t. __
 
Regenera-	Provide External as Face Mask Item 14
'Same 

tive Heat thermal and'leakage;
 
Exchanger humidity screen broken
 
(16) 	 control to at mask end
 
gas deliver-Dr clogged,
 
ed to mask. rs with vomit
 
Canister re- 'ail closed.'Prevent Umbrella Typ Valve - Can ot Fail Closed 
Outlet verse flow ail open. All Loss of Slightly Slightly None Not Not req'd. 3 
Valve through function, degraded degraded e q'd (17) 	 cartridge. performance. performance.
 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
 
SYSTEM: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
ASSEMBLY: 
MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE 
POE PREPARED BY: 
APPROVED BY: 
PAGE 8 OF 
DATE 
SUPERSEDING 
00 
S .0 
FNAME-AND 
NE 
ID NO. 
ITEM NO. 
Exhala-
tion 
Valve 
FUNCTION 
Prevent re-
verse flow 
through 
FAILURE MODE 
AND CAUSE 
Fail closed. 
Fail open. 
MISSION 
PHASE 
Denitrogen-
iZation and 
FAILURE EFFECT ON 
ASSEMBLY SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM 
-UmbrellaTyr Valve - Caniot Fail Closed 
Loss of LOSS of Loss of 
function, function, function. 
FAILURE 
DETECTION 
METHOD 
Crewman devel-
obs headache. 
TIME 
AVAIL 
No 
FAIL 
CORRECTIVE MODE 
ACTION CRITREV 
None 1 
(18)_. breathing
bag. 
Independent
IV Operation 
Independent
Rescue No None 
__ _ _ _ _ _ _
_BreathinBag (19) Breathinggas 
Ex t e r na l 
ExternalLeakage 
Ope r a t i o n 
Denitrogenization and "I None No None 
• 
1 
accumulator Independent 
IV Operation
Independent
Rescue 
Slightly
Degraded 
Slightly
Degraded 
None Not 
eq'd 
Not req'd. 3 
ReliefValve 
(20) 
Provide ameans of 
nitrogen 
purging. 
Fai -crosed.Fail open or 
leaks. 
Operation 
Denitrogen-
ization and 
Independent 
Umbrella TY 
Performance. Performance 
Valve - Caniot Fail Closed
'Loss of LOSS of 
function, function. 
None NO None 1 
_Operation
LiOH Scrub CO2 Shortened 
Canister from the life due to 
and gas to be contaminationCartridge inhaled. Dusting 
(21) 
Channelin 
Rupture Prevent 
Disc (22) catastropic Leakage' 
bottle fail-
ure in even 
of over-
pressuriza-
tion. 
IV Operation
Independent 
Rescue 
A11 ' 
l 
All ' 
DEternalenitrogen- None 
ization 
Independent Loss of 
IV Operation function. 
or Indepen­
dent Rescue 
Operation 
Degraded 
Performance 
LOss of 
function, 
None 
Loss of 
function. 
Degraded -. 
Performance 
Loss of 
function. 
" 
.Headache 
None 
Loss of 
function. 
None 
Headache 
Oral/Nasal 
Irritatioh 
Low bottle 
pressure. 
. 
Not 
1eq'd 
No 
No 
1eq'd
NO 
Not 
eq'd 
No 
Not reg'd. 
None,-
Not req'd. 
None 
Not req'd. 
None 
'T-3 
1 
3 
-
3 
-
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SYSTEM: MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE 
 PAGE 9 OF
SUBSYSTEM: POE 
 PREPARED BY: 
 DATE
ASSEMBLY: 
 APPROVED BY: 
 SUPERSEDING
 
NAME AND FAILURE EFFECT ON 
ID NO. FAILURE MODE MISSION DETECTION TIME CORRECTIVE MODE
ITEM NO. FUNCTION AND CAUSE PHASE ASSEMBLY 
 SUBSYSTEM SYSTEM METHOD AVAIL 
 ACTION CRIT REV
 
Inter- Provide Rupture due D6nitrogen- Loss of Loss of 
 Loss of Visual obser- Yes Use spare 3
stage verificatiorto flaw or ization function, function, function. vation of

Pressure of pressure overheating. POS.
 pressure gage
Gage (23) reducer 
 or none
performance. Independent 

" No None 1
 IVOeration 
Independent""" 

- Rescue
 
Operation
 
Leakage due Denitrogen-

" Yes Use spare 3
 to flaw. ization 
 POS.
 
Independent 

" No None 1IV Operation
" 
1Special 1l ' 
Independent "ote 

Rescue 
 No breathing
Operation 
 procedure.
 
Hovement 
 Denitrogen-
 " Not Not reqd. 3 
sticks. ization _eq'd 
Independent Visual obser- " "d 3
IV Operation 

=vationof gage.
Independent " " " -
Rescue
Operation
 
HAMILTON STANDARD -11 
aaUNIME 
-w TWINOWGES-
The following Critical Item List (CIL) lists and provides accep­
tance rationale for all criticality 1 and 3I failures identified
 
in the FMEA. The CIL'was prepared using the following guidelines.
 
A) 	Criticalities are defined per paragraph 7.Oe of the Statement
 
of Work:
 
1) 	Loss of life, injury, or loss of vehicle.
 
2) 	Loss of mission, which includes post-launch aborts and
 
launch delays sufficient to cause mission scrub.
 
3) 	All others.
 
Subscript I refers to failure to pass one or more redundancy
 
screens per NASA DRD RA-338T.
 
B) 	Corrective Action/Retention categories are:
 
1) 	Item for which analysis and test results support accepta­
bility and adequate procedures exist to minimize the
 
effect of occurrence or eliminate problem.
 
2) 	Item involving passive equipment characteristics.
 
Adequate safety margins exist and test results prove
 
acceptable.
 
C) 	Headings are per NASA DRD RA-339T.
 
B-11
 
LIST, CRITICAL ITEM (CIL)
SYSTEM MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE 

PREPARED BY
SUBSYSTEM 	 PAGE 1 OF'7POS
 
ASSEMBLY 

APPROVED BY 
 DATE
 
SUPERSEDING
 
NOTE: FMEA REFERENCE IS VIA NAME AND ITEM NUMBER
 
NAME AND CORRECTIVE NO. OPID NO. CRITICALITY FAILURE MODE
(I 	 FAILURE EFFECT ACTION/
NO. 	 AND CAUSE MISSION PHASE ON SYSTEM RETENTION CRITICAL RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
(ITEMNO.)CLASSIFICATION 	 ITEMS 
Bottle 1 p02
Ruture or leak- Denitrogeni- Possible 

age due to flaw zation, In- Loss of Life See Hazard a) Bottle will be of "fail safe"
 
(1) 	 *C or B (See f) 1 Low Probability of Occurrence 
c 	 or overheating dependent IV Analyses design by fracture mechanics 
-Operation, 	 IA-06-POS-4 
 failure mode is leakage not
Independent 
 catastrophic rupture.

Rescue 
 b) System contains a burst disc to
Operation 
 prevent over-pressurization due
to heating.
 
c) Non-destructive testing to be

used to verify no flaws.
 
.d) 	Leakage due to a flaw is cyclic
 
inducedwould be detected during
 
ground charge. Should not occur
during discharge. Stress on
 
bottle induced by recharge in
 
Wvehicle 	 is approx. 25% of stress
induced by ground charge pres­
sure, therefore, unlikely this
will induce leakage.

e) Loss of pressure should be de­
tected prior to independent use.
 
Use spare POS.
 
f) If leakage does occur during
 
Independent Rescue Operation, it
 
may 	be possible to continue the
transfer by a special routine of
 
breathing, lifting the mask dur­
ing part of the inhalation/ex­halation cycle.
 
Assume 02 pressure gage not being

monitored.
 
Pressure Rupture of leak- Denitrogeni- Possible C or B (See i) LowProbability. f Occurrence
Gage (2) 
 age 	due to flaw zation, In-
 Loss of Life See IA-06-POS-4 
 a) Gage uses a helical element
or overheating dependent IV 
 having a cycle life in excess
 
Operation,

Independent 	 of 100,000 cycles.'
b) Design is low stress using high
Rescue 
 factors of safety.
Operation 
 c) Actual experience indicates
 
gages leak not rupture.
d) Gage is of "fail safe" design by
 
fracture mechanics.
 
SYSTEM LIST, CRITICAL ITEM (CIL)
MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE

SUBSYSTEM POS 

PREPARED BY PAGE 2 or 7
 
ASSEMBLY APPROVED BY DATE
 
SUPERSEDING
 
NOTE: FMEA REFERENCE IS VIA NAME AND ITEM NUMBER 
AND-MD 
ID NO. CRITICALITY 
INE 
FAILURE MODE FAILURE EFFECT 
CORRECTIVE 
ACTION/ 
NO. OF 
(ITEM NO.) AND CAUSE ON SYSTEM RETENTION CRITICAL RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 
CLASSIFICATION ITEMS 
e) Gage case vented to prevent
 
rupture.
 
f) Non-destructive testing to be us(
to verify no flaws.
g) Leakage due to a flaw is detectec
 
during ground charge. Should not
 
occur during discharge. 25% of
 
stress induced by ground charge
h)
LOSS of pressure should be detect
 
will induce leakage.
 
pressure, therefore, unlikely thi
 
ed prior to independent use.
in spare POS. Use
i) If le kage does occur during In­
(4 dependent Rescue Operation, it mab  Possible to continue the trans
 
fer by a special routine of
 
breathing, lifting the mask durin
part of the inhalation/exhalation
cycle.
02 Shutoff 1External
Valve (3) leak Independent Possible
due to housing IV Operation, C Or B (See 1
Loss of Life Rationale) Low Probability of Occurren~e
defect or seal Independent If leakage does occur during Indepen

malfunction. See IA-06-POS-5A
Rescue dn escue
Operation Operato, i ma epos
dent Rescue Oporatzcn, it may be pos
sible to contine the transfer by a
special routine of breathing, liftin
 
the mask during part of the inhalati
 
exhalation cycle.
 
1 Jammed closed. Independent C 'LowProbabii y of occurrence 
IV Operation See IA-06-POS-SA a) ,Cyclic operation required to in­
duce jamming-increased resistance 
of valve would be detected during
ground checkout.b) Storage environment does not in­duce cold welding or corrosive
seizure. 
I 
LIST, CRITICAL ITEM (CIL)
SUBSYSTEMY TEM POSMAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE
 
ASSEMBLy 

NOTE: FMEA REFERENCE IS VIA NAME AND ITEM NUMBER
 
PREPARED BY PAGE 3 OF 7 
APPROVED BY 
 DATE
 
SUPERSEDING
 
RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
 
Low Probability of Occurrence

a) Check valve upstream limits
 
leakage.

b) Connector had redundant sealing

cap.
 
c) If leakage does occur during In­
dependent Rescue Operation, it ma
 
be possible to continue the trans
 
fer by a special routine of
breathing, lifting the mask durin
 
part of the inhalation/exhalation
 
cycle.

Low Probability of Occurrence
 
a) All of the stressed components
 
are subject to low stress levels.
 
b) A fail open condition requires

failure of the control spring

which sees no cyclic stress and
 
is designed for infinite life
 
when fully compressed.
 
c) In the event of a malfunction,
 
the spare POS can be used.
 
d) If leakage does occur during In­dependent Rescue Operation, it mal
 
be possible to continue the trans­
fer by a special routine of
 
breathing, lifting the mask durinc
part of the.inhalation/exhalation"
 
cycle.
 
A shift in set point is not likely
 
failure (see above). Based on exper­
ience, leakage failures occur when
 
unit is first turned on. This can bE
 
detected and crewman can use spare
 
POS.
 
Low Probability of Occurrence'
 
Setting well above normal operating
 
Pprssure. No reason for valve to
 open or leak. Normal operating pres­
sure is not high enough to cause seal
extrusion.
 
NAME AND 

ID NO; CRITICALITY 

(ITEM NO.) 

02 Disconnect 1 
(5) 

Pressure 1 

Reducer 

(6) 

Hi Pressure 1 

Relief 

Valve
(7) 
FAILURE MODE 

AND CAUSE 

Leakage while 

disconnected. 

Fails open, due 

to spring fail-

ure, regulates 

above set 

point, leaks 

cessively, fails 

closed or flows 

less than meta-

bolic require-

ments, or leaks 

internallye 

Opens when it 

should not, 

or leaks. 

MISSION PHASE
 
Independent

IV Operation, 

Independent

Rescue
Operation 

Independent 

IV Operation, 

Independent 

Rescue 

Operation 

Independent 

IV Operation, 

Independent
Rescu 
Operation 

FAILURE EFFECT 

ON SYSTEM 

Possible 

Loss of Life 

Possible 

Loss of Life 

Possible 

Loss of Life See lA-06-POS-5A 

CORRECTIVE NO. OF
 
ACTION/
 
RETENTION CRITICAL 

CLASSIFICATION ITEMS 
C or B (See c) 1
See lA-06-POS-SA 

C or B (See d) 1 

See IA-O6-POS-5A 

C 1 
LIST, CRITICAL ITEM (CIL)
 
SYSTEM MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE PREPARED BY PAGE 4 OF 7
 
SUBSYSTEM POS APPROVED BY DATE
 
ASSEMBLY SUPERSEDING
 
NOTE: FMEA REFERENCE IS VIA NAME AND ITEM NUMBER
 
NAME AND CORRECTIVE NO. OF
 
FAILURE MODE FAILURE EFFECT ACTION/

ID NO. CRITICALITY MISSION PHASE RETENTION CRITICAL RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
 
(ITEM NO.) AND CAUSE ON SYSTEM CLASSIFICATION ITEMS
 
Demand 
Regulator 
1 Fails open or 
leaks 
Independent
IV Operation, 
Possible. 
Loss of Life 
C or B (See d)
See lA-06-POS-5A 
i Low Probability of Occurrence 
a) Requires failure of a low stressed 
(8) internally. Independent
Rescue 
Operation 
spring.
b) Regulator can be checked prior to 
use of the system. 
c) If found leaking, use spare POS. 
Also, if checkout is okay, its not 
likely to failure during next use. 
d) If leakage does occur during In­
dependent Rescue Operation, it may
be possible to continue the trans­
fer by a special routine of 
i IndependentIV Operation 
breathing, lifting the mask during 
part of the inhalation/exhalation 
cycle. 
1 External 
Leakage IndependentRescue Possible Loss of Life C or B See IA-06-POS-5A I Same as Shutoff Valve. 
Operation 
Flow 1 Leakage due to Independent Possible C 1 Low probability of occurrence. Bag 
Compensating 
Bag (10) 
tear or flaw. IV or Deni-
trogenization 
Loss of Life See lA-06-POS-5A capable of operating at pressures 
many times normal operating pressure.
Bag will be protected and can be 
checked prior to use. If found leak­
ing, use spare POS. 
02 Inlet 
Hose (13) 
1 External Leak Denitrogeni-
zation and 
Possible 
Loss of Life 
C 
See lA-06-POS-5A 
1 Can be checked for leakage prior to 
use - if leaking, use spare POS. 
Independent 
IV Operation 
Mask (14) 
and Breath-
ing Hose 
(15) 
1 Leakage Denitrogeni-
zation and 
Independent 
IV Operation 
Possible 
Loss of Life 
B 
See IA-06-POS-SA 
I Must check out to verify seal integ­
rity prior to use. Once checked, not 
probable that leak will develop. 
LIST, CRITICAL ITEM (CIL)
 
SYSTEM'' MAN/POS OR MAN/PbS/VEHICLE 'PREPARED BY PAGE 5 OF 7, 
SUBSYSTEM POS APPROVED BY DATE 
ASSEMBLY SUPERSEDING 
NOTE: FMEA REFERENCE IS VIA NAME AND ITEM NUMBER
 
NAME AND CORRECTIVE NO. OF
 
FAILURE MODE ACTION/

ID NO. CRITICALITY MISSION PHASE FAILURE EFFECT RCTIAN/(ITEM NO.) AND CAUSE ON SYSTEM RETENTION ITEMSjiTEMNO.)CLASSIFICATION 
Regenera-
dtive Heat 
Exchanger 
' I. Screen 
brokbn at 
mask end. 
Denitrogenization 
Independent IV 
Operation and 
Possible In-
halation of 
Loose Balls 
C 
See IA-06-POS-7 
1 Screen has high strength margin. 
(16) Independeht 
Rescue Operation-
I Clogged, as 
with vomit. 
Denitrogenization 
Independent IV, 
Operation and 
Cannot exhale C 
without lifting See lA-06 - . 
mask, thus pos- POS-8 
1 If nauseous, astronaut shall be 
pkepared to doff mask while 
vomiting. 
Independent s'ible injury. 
Rescue Operation 
1 External 
Leakage 
Denitr6gbnization 
and Independent
IV Opetation 
Possible B 
Loss of Life See 1A-06-POSA6 
1 Chebk but to verify integrity prior 
to use. Once checked, hot probable
that leak will develop. 
Exhalatioh 
Valve (18) 
1 Fails 
Open 
Independent 
Operation 
Possible CO2 
Poisoning 
B 1 
See lA-06-POS-lA 
Must be and can be checked by user 
prior to use. Not a likely failure 
subsequent to check out. 
Breathing 
Bag (19) 
1 External 
Leakage 
Denitrogenization 
and Ihde&indbnt, 
Possible loss 
of life due td 
B 
See l-O6-
1 Must be and cai 
prior to use. 
be checked by user 
IV Operatioh loss of 02 or POS-6 
ing6stioh of 
contaminating 
atmosphere. 
Relief 1 Fails Open Denitrogenizatibn Same as above. B 1 Same is above. 
Valve 
(20) 
or Leaks and Independent 
IV Operation 
See lA-06-POS-6 
LiOH 
Cartridge 
and 
Caiiidter 
(20) 
Contamina-' 
tion or 
Channeling 
All Possible CO2Poisoning 
C 1 
See TA-06-POS-IA 
Low probability of occurrence due to 
processing controls and use of sen­
sors to 'erify integrity ipon instal 
lation: The preload pads plus ad-' 
herence to assembly pr66edfes will 
prevent channeling. 
SYSTEM 
SUBSYSTEM 
MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE 
POS 
LIST, CRITICAL ITEM (CIL) 
PREPARED BY 
APPROVED BY 
PAGE 
DATE 
6 OF 7 
SUPERSEDING 
NOTE: FMEA REFERENCE IS VIA NAME AND ITEM NUMBER 
O 6 
NAME AND 
ID NO. CRITICALITY FAILUREMODE FAILURE EFFECT 
CORRECTIVEACTION/ NO. OF 
O 
(ITEMNO.) 
Rupture
Disc (32) 
Interstage 
Pressure 
Gage (23) 
1 
ANDCAUSE 
External 
Leakage 
Rupture 
SS 
Independent IV 
and Independent 
Rescue Operation 
Independent IV 
and Independent 
Rescue Operation 
ON SYSTEM RETENTION CRITICAL 
CLASSIFICATION ITEMS 
Possible B 
Loss of Life See IA-06-POS-SA 
Possible C or B (See f) 1 
Loss of Life See IA-06-POS-5A 
RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 
Low probability of occurrence. Ifdisc were to leak, it would do so 
during storage, and this would be 
detected prior to use of the system.
The spare POS could be used. 
LOW Probability of Occurrence 
a) Gage uses a helical element 
having a cycle life in excess of 
b) Design is low stress using high 
factors of safety.
c) Actual experience indicates 
gages leak, not rupture.
d) Gage is of "fail safe" design by
Fracture Mechanics. 
e) Gage case vented to preventrupture. 
f) If leakage does occur during In­
dependent Rescue Operation, it 
may be possible to continue the 
transfer by a special routine of 
breathing, lifting the mask dur­
ing part of the inhalation/ex­halation cycle. 
Makeup Flow 
(12)(12) 
Pressure 
(6) 
3, 
31 
Fails Open 
External 
Leakage 
All 
Denitrogenization 
Degraded 
Performance 
Lo's of 
Function 
C 
C 
1 
1 
Integrity of valve verified during 
periodic ground check out. Fails
redundancy screen b). 
Low probability of occurrence. 
Fails redundancy screen b). 
High 
Pressure 
Relief 
31 Opens when 
it should 
not or leaks, 
Denitrogenization Excessive 
use of 
vehicle 02 
C 1 Low probability of occurrence. 
Setting well above normal operating
pressure. No reason for valve to 
open or leak. Normal operating 
pressure is not high enough to causeseal extrusti6n. 
. LIST, CRITICAL ITEM (CIL)
 
SYSTEM MAN/POS OR MAN/POS/VEHICLE PREPARED BY' . PAGE 7 OF i., 
SUBSYSTEM &OS APPROVED BY DATE 
ASSEMBLY SUPERSEDING 
NOTE: FMEA REFERENCE IS VIA NAME AND ITEM NUMBER 
N AND CORRECTIVE NO. OFID ND FAILURE MODE FAILURE EFFECT ACTION/

ID NO. CRITICALITY MISSION PHASE CRITICAL RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
 
(ITEM NO.) AND CAUSE ON SYSTEM CLASSIFICATION ITEMS
 
Demand 
Regulator 
(8) 
31 External 
leakage or 
fails open 
or leaks 
internally 
Denitrogenization Same as above. C 1 Low probability of occurrence. 
Open failure requires failure of a 
low stressed spring. Regulator can 
be checked prior to use of the sys­
tem. If check out okay, not likely 
to fail during next use. 
Flow 
Compensating 
3, Leakage due 
to tear or 
Independent 
Rescue Operation 
Slightly 
Degraded 
C 1' Slightly degraded performance would 
not affect mission. 
Bag (10) flake. Function 
02 Inlet 31 External Same as above. Degraded B 1 Can be checked for leakage prior to 
Hose (13) Leakage Performance use. 
Mask (14) and 
Breathing Hose 
31 Leakage Same as above. Same as above. B 1 Same as above. 
(15) and Re­
generative 
Heat Exchanger(16) 
Canister 
Outlet Check 
Valve (17) 
31 Fail Open All Slightly 
Degraded 
Performance 
C 1 Slightly higher inlet CO2 PP to mask 
Breathing 
Bag (19) 
31 External 
Leakage 
Independent
Rescue Operation slightlyDegraded -C 1 Can be checked for leakage prior touse. 
Performance 
Relief 31 Fail open Same as above. Degraded C 1 Same as above: 
Valve (20) or leaks. Performance 
HAMILTON STANDARD 0-D-
UNWIED 
TECHMOWGIES 
SAFETY GUIDELINES, CONSTRAINTS, AND REQUIREMENTS
 
The safety approach has been to search out safety concerns and to
 
use foreknowledge to eliminate, suppress, or control them. This
 
search has been applied actively.
 
The basic safety requirements are established by Specification
 
CSD-SH-025 and Exhibit A, the Statement of Work. The POS is to
 
a) supply life support under all required conditions and modes,
 
b) to be self donning, c) to provide eye protection, d) to pre­
clude any condition in which with a collapsed bag the oxygen sup­
ply should be blocked, and 3) to prevent lack of visibility by

condensate on the face plate. In addition, SE-R-0006 was invoked
 
to control flammability, odor, and off-gassing; and JSCM 8080
 
Manned Spacecraft Criteria & Standards were invoked as guideline
 
in order to minimize inherent, interface or human factors hazards.
 
Requirements (a) through (e) above are met by the POS design.

The provisions of SE-R-0006 can be satisfied for flight versions
 
of the POS design, but with mutual agreement have been deviated
 
for some of the materials, such as face mask and hoses, to permit
 
use of appropriate available substitutes.
 
CSD-SH025, paragraph 3.1.3.1, points out that redundancy shall be
 
provided at spacecraft level by providing one more POS than the
 
total number of crew and passengers. This partial redundancy may
 
be applied if a POS anomaly occurs and is- revealed at predonning

check out, or if one occurs and is detected during IV use. Cer­
tain failure modes now classified as criticality 1 may be correct­
able by this redundancy if the crewman observes the oxygen pres­
sure gages while on IV independent operation. In connection with
 
the spacecraft level redundancy approach and assuming stowage is
 
in the cabin, a possible limitation is that part of the crew may
 
be isolated from the spare POS by the airlock in event of an
 
emergency in the space lab. A spare POS in both cabin and space
 
lab would remove this limitation.
 
Much of the POS usage which can credibly experience a criticality
 
1 failure is emergency usage. Thus, in an overall spacecraft
 
sense, the failure would not be a single point failure and would
 
not violate the usual spacecraft prohibition against single fail­
ure points. Such failures would not necessarily meet requirement
 
2 of JSCM 8080 Standard No. 12 which states that "During an abort
 
the single failure or malfunction in a subsystem or component
 
shall not cause loss of life." However, justification has been
 
provided as required by the Standard. Also, the normal denitro­
genization missions involve several possible single failure
 
points, and the POS does not meet JSCM Standard 143 and C02 de­
tection. Justification of the above conditions is the capability
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HAMILTON STANDARD D,-"J' 
to check out the POS, the low failure rates of components, and
 
the short exposure. The FMEA and Hazard Analyses cover'critical­
ity 1 failures modes and their justification in detail'
 
Results
 
The safety approach described above including study of detailed
 
alternatives in the design has led to positive safety features.
 
Among these, the following are prominent:
 
1) 	The 02 bottle is designed for infinite life, i.e., unlimited
 
cycles of charge and discharge.
 
2. 	There is a positive means to determine that a canister/
 
cartridge is fresh.
 
3. 	Relief provision in event of a failed open regulator is
 
adequate to prevent excess breathing pressure.
 
4. 	The unit is protected from incidental physical damage by its
 
cover and is not prone to snagging by external objects.
 
5. 	Crewmen are positively isolated from touch temperatures over
 
1130F.
 
6. 	Crewmen are protected against breathing temperatures above
 
ll0OF dry bulb and from excessively cold temperatures, even
 
in event of a failure.
 
7. 	Provision is made for continuous ventilation to prevent con­
densation and maintain visibility through the face plate.
 
8. 	The mask is capable of being lifted from the face quickly, if
 
necessary.
 
9. 	The face plate is shatterproof, and gage faces are vented.
 
10. 	 The POS is designed to be washable in the areas where exhaled
 
gases flow or are contained, thus preventing bacterial buildup
 
or infection.
 
Hazard Analyses
 
Hazards have been searched from the FMEA criticality 1 -items by
 
review relative to intended procedures and handling, by reflec­
tion of the design against the guidelines and constraints, and by
 
reflection of the design against the MSC Space Flight Hazards
 
Catalog, MSC00134, and against the Skylab System Safety Checklist.
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HAMILTON STANDARD /C " 
The analysis was conducted using the Rockwell "Reliability and
 
Safety Desk Instruction No. 400-1, Hazards Analyses Procedures"
 
which amplifies on applicable portions of NHB5300.4 (ID) and
 
MIL-STD-882.
 
In accordance with 400-1, all hazards which are physically pos­
sible were considered irrespective of probability of occurrence,
 
means existing in the design to control the hazard, number of
 
failures required to cause damage or loss, redundancy, etc. The
 
hazards are either in Residual or Controlled Status.
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SPACE-SHUTTLE HAZARD ANALYSIS
 
HAZARD GROUP HAZARDCODE HAZARDNO. 
Loss o/Unsafe Environment DD IA-0-POS-lA 
SUBSYSTEM/OPERATION MISSION PHASE 
POS 
REFERENCES 
,HAZARD
 
CO2 Poisoning
 
HAZARD DESCRIPTION 
An improperly charged canister (i.e., with poisoned or exhausted LiOH)

could result in C02 poisoning even though the pressure indicator showed
 
it to be fresh.
 
CAUSES
 
Failure to observe procedures for storage and charging of LiOH.
 
Note: 	 See also two modes of failure on page.5 of the Critical Item
 
List and their Rationale for Acceptance.
 
EFFECTS
 
Possible loss of life.
 
HAZARD LEVEL HAZARD CATEGORY PREPARED BY 
 DATE
 
I A 	 Revision
10/30/75
 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 	 B-22 
lA-06-POS-lA
 
REQUIREMENT RESPONSIBLE 
ENGINEER 
VERIFICATION' 
REQUIREMENTS IMPLEMENTATION 
Controls of procurement, storage, and handling are adequate for 
the hazard to be considered controlled. Thecontrols~are 
summarized as follows: 
Activity 
 Procedure
 
Covered Procedure for POS Prototype for Flight POS
 
Procurement 	 Procured to MIL Specification, Same as for
 
with requirement for certifica- prototype.
 
tion and analysis.
 
Packaging 	 Shipped in sealed plastic bag Same as for
 
in can with sealed cover, prototype.
 
Receipt at 	 Verification of presence of Lot Same as for pro-

HS 	 Number plus presence and cor- totype plus ver­
rectness of Part Number and. ification of chem
 
analysis. ical composition
 
of sample froi
 
each lot.
 
Storage at Stored in shipping container. Same as for
 
HS prototype.
 
Charging of Bag opened only in LiOH charge Same as for
 
POS rig after complete purge of rig prototype.
 
with N2. Cartridge charged and
 
assembled in charge-rig; then
 
put in plastic bag. Bag is heat
 
sealed immediately upon removal
 
from rig and placed in 2nd bag,
 
HAZARDSTATUS,
 
OPEN 
 CLOSED CLOSURE DOCUMENT 
CONCURRENCEIN-WORK RESIDUAL ELIMINATED CONTROLLED ACCEPTED REFERENCE DATE 
SAFETY RESP. GROUP 
x 
*IFREQUIREMENT IS NOT IMPLEMENTED PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR. NON-COMPLIANCE INSTEAD. 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 (BACK) 
IA-06-POS-lA (Continued) 

_ 
REQUIREMENTS RESPONSIBLE VERIFICATION 
SENGINEER "REQUIREMENTS__ IMPLEMENTATIpN 
Activity 
Covered Procedure for POS Prototype 
Procedure for 
Flight POS 
Cartrid4e 
Acceptance 
Test 
Cartridge removed from bags while 
in LiOH charge rig and installed in 
canister. Delta P checked with N2 
or 02. Canister then charged to 
2 psi with 02 and sealed on car­
tridge removed and resealed in 
plastic bags. 
Same as for 
prototype. 
Storage of 
Cartridge 
Cartridge stored either in charged 
canister with indicator or in 
double plastic bags. 
Same as for 
prototype. 
Manned 
Evaluation 
Test 
Above procedures plus redundant CO2 
sensing in the loop. 
N/A 
w'In the event of a headache during IV operationj the si5are POS 
w should be substituted. 
HAZARDSTATUS, 
IN-WORK 
OPEN 
RESIDUAL ELIMINATED 
CLOSED 
CONTROLLED ACCEPTED 
CLOSURE DOCUMENT 
REFERENCE DATE 
CONCURRENCE 
SAFETY RESP.GROUP 
x 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 (BACK) 
*IFREQUIREMENT ISNOT IMPLEMENTED PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE INSTEAD. 
SPACE SHUTTLE HAZARD ANALYSIS
 
HAZARD GROUP HAZARDCODE HAZARD NO. 
Fire Explosion D IA-06-POS-2A 
SUBSYSTEM/OPERATION MISSIONPHASE 
POS All 
REFERENCES 
HAZARD
 
Fire in high pressure 02 system.
 
HAZARD DESCRIPTION 
Organic contaminant particles driven against valve seats, etc. can
 
initiate combustion.
 
CAUSES
 
Lack of cleanliness disciplines.
 
EFFECTS
 
Injury to crewman.
 
HAZARD LEVEL HAZARD CATEGORY PREPARED BY DATE 
Revision
I 
 A 10/30/75
 
FORM 3981- REV. 10"73 B-25
 
IA-06-POS-2A
 
RESPONSIBLE 	 VERIFICATION-REQUIREMENTS 
ENGINEER REQUIREMENTS IMPLEMENTATION 
Cleanliness of the system and the 02 charge is the key to
 
prevention of fire.
 
Parts or
 
Activity Covered Prc:edure for Flight and Prototype POS
 
Procured 	 Cleaned per MIL-STD-1246A, Level 100A.
 
Components 	 Packaged in double plastic bags. Unpackaged
 
and handled only 	in clean work station.
 
Detail Cleaned per HS 3150, CD-3. Packaged in plas-

Parts tic bags. Unpackaged and handled only in
 
clean work station.
 
Assembly Use only details cleaned as above. Assembly
 
completed within clean work station. Unit not
 
removed from work station until the assembly
 
to is complete and-all ports are covered.
 
Test 	 Test rig complet&ly cleaned per HS 3150 CD-3.
 
Gas.supplied to system through a filter.
 
Oxygen is certified MIL-0-27210 oxygen.
 
Storage 	 POS stored with all ports covered.'
 
Recharge Dependent on vehicle gas supply and procedures
 
in Flight
 
The controls, through storage, are adequate for the hazard to
 
be considered "controlled". Flight safety depends on NASA pror

cedures. Therefore, overall status must be "Residual"_endinQc

adoption of flight procedures bYH4MATATUS,
 
OPEN CLOSED CLOSURE DOCUMENT 
CONCURRENCEIN-WORK RESIDUAL ELIMINATED CONTROLLED ACCEPTED REFERENCE DATE 
-
-SAFETY'-I 	
-- RESP.§R*OUP_ 
*IF REQUIREMENT IS NOT IMPLEMENTED PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR NONCOMPLIANCE INSTEAD.
 
FORM 3981.F REV. 10-73 (BACK)
 
SPACE SHUTTLE HAZARD ANALYSIS
 
HAZARD GROUP HAZARD CODE HAZARD NO. 
Burn (Hot Surface Contact) AA 10-06-POS-3A 
SUBSYSTEM/OPERATION MISSION PHASE 
POS All Operational 
REFERENCES 
HAZARD
 
Burn by contact with hot container.
 
HAZARD DESCRIPTION 
In operation the LiOH cartridge gets up to 200 0 F. 
Normal contact is
prevented by a cover. If cover is ineffective or if cartridge is

removed before cooldown and without protective gloves, burns may occur.
 
CAUSES
 
Ineffective cover due to contamination of the gold plated inner

surface or removal of a cartridge before cooldown.
 
EFFECTS 
Skin burns. 
HAZARD LEVEL HAZARD CATEGORY PREPARED BY DATE 
III A Revision 
10/31/75 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 B-27 
lA-06-POS-3A
 
W 
ENREQENGINEER 
RESPONSIBLE 
-EUUIREMENTS 
VERIFICATION-
IMPL.EMENTATqN 
There must be handling cautions for the gold plate cover and 
strict procedures for removal of cartridges. 
This hazard is classed as -esidual until NASA generated 
instructions deal with it. 
HAZARD STATUS, 
IN-WORK 
OPEN 
RESIDUAL ELIMINATED 
CLOSED 
CONTROLLED ACCEPTED 
CLOSURE DOCUMENT 
REFERENCE DATE 
CONCURRENCE 
SAFETY RESP. GROUP 
x 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10.73 (BACK) 
*IF REQUIREMENT IS NOT IMPLEMENTED PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR NON-COMPLIANPE INSTEAD. 
SPACE SHUTTLE HAZARD ANALYSIS
 
HAZARD GROUP HAZARDCODE HAZARD NO. 
Flying Debris BB IA-06-POS-4 
SUBSYSTEMIOPERATION MISSION PHASE 
POS All with charged bottle.
 
REFERENCES
 
HAZARD 
Explosive Rupture
 
HAZARD DESCRIPTION 
A high pressure bottle, pressure gage, etc. if not designed and proved
with respect to facture characteristics can create high velocity debris
 
upon rupture.
 
CAUSES
 
Flaw or corrosion, coupled with design deficiency. This hazard is a
prominent category of hazard for pressure vessels and is documented
 
even though eliminated by design.
 
EFFECTS
 
Injury
 
HAZARD LEVEL HAZARDCATEGORY PREPARED BY DATE 
Revision
I A 10/31/75 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 B-29 
I 
IA-06-POS-4
 
-- VE9IFICATION'REQUIREMENTS 	 RESPONSIBLE . VERIFICATION* 
. ENGINEERi REQUIREMENt IMPLEMENTAION 
The bottle is designed to leak rather than burst, under all
 
possible combinations of loading, both static and fatique, both
 
pressure loading and vibration, shock and acceleration.
 
HAZARD STATUS, 
IN-WORK 
OPEN 
RESIDUAL ELIMINATED 
CLOSED 
CONTROLLED ACCEPTED 
CLOSURE DOCUMENT 
REFERENCE DATE 
CONCURRENCE 
x 
SAFETY RESP. GROUP 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 (BACK) 
*IF REQUIREMENT ISNOT IMPLEMENTED PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE INSTEAD. 
SPACE SHUTTLE HAZARD ANALYSIS 
HAZARD GROUP HAZARD CODE HAZARD NO. 
Loss of Oxygen DD IA-06-POS-5A
 
SUBSYSTEM/OPERATION 
 MISSION PHASE
 
POS R Independent Operation
 
REFERENCES 
HAZARD
 
Loss of oxygen from the POS.
 
HAZARD DESCRIPTION 
Exhaustion Of oxygen before completion of usage during independent

operation due to leakage.
 
CAUSES 
Failed seals, cracked or torn flow compensator, porous housings, loose
fittings, pinhole corrosion, fatique cracks, etc.
 
EFFECTS 
Possible loss of life. 
HAZARD LEVEL 
I 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 
HAZARD CATEGORY 
A 
PREPARED BY 
B-31 
DATE 
Revision 
10/31/75 
1A-06-POS-5A
 
REQUIREMENTS- RESPONSIBLE. 
ENGINEER. 
- -
VERIFICATION' 
REQUIREMENTS' IMPLEMENTAtibN 
Provide leakage check out prior to use. Provide for astronaut 
monitoring of pressure gage to permit timely action in event of 
leakage, such as switch to spare POS when IV or to accelerate 
transfer and minimize demand during EV. 
This hazard is classed as residual pending adoption of flight 
procedures by NASA. 
HAZARD STATUS, 
IN-WORK 
OPEN 
RESIDUAL 
x 
ELIMINATED 
CLOSED 
CONTROLLED ACCEPTED 
CLOSURE DOCUMENT 
REFERENCE DATE 
CONCURRENCE 
SAFETY RESP. GROUP 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 (BACK) 
*IF REQUIREMENT ISNOT IMPLEMENTED PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE INSTEAD. 
SPACE SHUTTLE HAZARD ANALYSIS
 
HAZARD GROUP HAZARDCODE HAZARD NO. 
Toxicity DD IA-06-POS-6A, 
SUBSYSTEM/OPERATION MISSION PHASETllINP,'Mission OperationsPOS Independent Operation
 
REFERENCES
 
HAZARD
 
Inaestion of foul or toxic cas. 
HAZARD DESCRIPTION 
During inhalation, system pressure in the regenerative loop is slightly
below ambient. If leaking occurs,:the POS would not protect against

possible toxic gases.
 
CAUSES 
A leak in the breathing bag or any other portion of the regenerative

loop.
 
EFFECTS
 
Possible loss of life or injury:
 
HAZARD LEVEL HAZARD CATEGORY PREPARED SY DATE 
Revision
I 
 A 
 10/31/75
 
'ORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 B-33 
1A-06-POS-6
 
REQUIREMENTS RESPONSIBLE VERIFICATION*~~~ENGINEER II'" 
.. .. •ER -~RE yQUI-MEjT, l IMPEMENTATIOIiIN 

The POS should be checked for tightness after any usage. The
 
low exposure times and the low failure rates justify acceptance

of this hazard.
 
w
 
IN-WORK 
OPEN 
RESIDUAL 
X 
ELIMINATED 
HAZARD STATUS, 
CLOSED 
CONTROLLED ACCEPTED 
CLOSURE DOCUMENTCLOSURE DOCUMENT 
REFERENCE DATE 
CONCURRENCE 
SAFETY RESP. GROUP 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 (BACK) 
*IF REQUIREMENT ISNOT IMPLEMENTED PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE INSTEAD. 
SPACE SHUTTLE HAZARD ANALYSIS
 
HAZARD GROUP HAZARD CODE HAZARD NO. 
Contamination DD 1A-06-POS-7 
SUBSYSTEM/OPERATION MISSION PHASE 
POS Mission Operations 
REFERENCES 
HAZARD 
Choking from foreign object ingestion.
 
HAZARD DESCRIPTION 
If the "pebbles" in the regenerative heat exchanger come loose, the'y
 
could be swept into the breathing stream and cause chdking.
 
CAUSES 
Failure of the retaining screen.
 
EFFECTS
 
Possible suffocation.
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I A 
-ORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 B-35 
IA-06-POS-7
 
REQUIREMENTS jVERIFICATION"TRESPONSIBLE ,7 
,RURMT 
 ,ENGINEER 'REQUIREMENTSIIMPLEMENTATION6 
The strength of the screen is such that this hazard is reduced tb
 
a controlled level.
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HAZARD GROUP HAZARD CODE HAZARD NO. 
Loss oUnsafe Environment 
 DD 
 IA-06-POS-8
 
SUBSYSTEMIOPERATION MISSION PHASE 
POS 	 Independent Rescue Operation
 
'REFERENCES 
HAZARD 
Loss of regenerative function.
 
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
A) 	If the astronaut should vomit into the regenerative heat exchanger,
it could be clogged, and the regenerative feature of the POS would
be lost, limiting the time available for transfer.
B) 	If the exhalation check valve, item 18, 
fails open, the regenerative

feature would be lost.
 
CAUSES
 
EFFECTS.-

C02 	Poisoning
 
HAZARD LEVEL HAZARD CATEGORY PREPARED BY DATE
 
II A 
FORM 3981-F REV. 10-73 B-37 
iA-O 6-POS-8 
SREQUIREMENTS RESPONSIBLEENGINEER VEIgiFICATION-MPET 
_tREQUIREMENTS, IMPLEMENTATION 
A) If nauseous, the crew member in the Rescue Ball must be 
prepared to pull off the mask before vomiting. 
B) The regenerative action can be partially restored by holding
the breathing bag in a collapsed position. 
Note: Without the regenerative function, C02 concentration 
would reach in the Rescue Ball. 
WI
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The POS FMEA has identified several criticality 1 failure modes
 
which are not readily detectable or obvious to the crewman.
 
These are failure of the check valve at the inlet to the breath­
ing bag and inward leakage any where in the breathing circuit.
 
The following procedure specifically checks for these two fail­
ures and provides any indications that the system is operational.
 
Check Point Procedure 
a) Bottle Pressure Verify bottle pressure gage 
reading at proper level. 
b) LiOH Verification Verify indicator pin on side of 
LiOH canister is visible. 
c) Exhalation Check Valve Place mask on face and exhale. 
Attempt to inhale from system. 
Breathing bag should not collapse 
and crewman should not be able to 
inhale. 
d) Inward Leakage Open canister. Place mask to 
face inhale from system and ex­
hale to ambient. Once bag is 
collapsed, crewman should not be 
able to inhale. 
e) 02 Supply Check Out With canister closed, connect to 
02 supply. Verify that inter­
stage pressure is 33.5 + 6 psi. 
Place mask to face and inhale. 
Crewman should feel flow from 
demand regulator. 
In the event of emergency use in a contaminated cabin, the crew­
man should only do steps (a) and (b) prior to donning the system.
 
Once the system is operational, the crewman can check for inward
 
leakage by shutting off the 02 supply (close valve on POS or dis­
connect fill line as applicable) and breathing until the bag is
 
depleted. The crewman should attempt to inhale slowly and should
 
not be able to. The 02 supply should then be reestablished and
 
the canisters shut off. If the crewman can inhale without open­
ing the demand regulator, the exhalation check valve is not func­
tioning and the system should be replaced.
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1.0 SCOPE 
This specification defines the portable oxygen subsystem limit life items and defines 
requirements for inspection and historical data/records. 
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
Drawings 
SVSK 90390 - Portable Oxygen Subsystem 
Standards 
Mil-HDBK-695 - Military Standardization
 
Handbook Rubber Products:
 
Shelf Storage Life
 
3.0 REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 Time/Cycle Items List 
All items in the POS are capable of more than 1000 hours of operation and 1000 operating 
cycles both of which exceed the life requirements of the POS. Therefore, there are no 
time/cycle limited items in the POS. 
3.2 Age - Controlled Items List 
The prototype POS utilizes some items containing materials requiring age control as 
defined by Mil-HDBK-695. The details, materials age control limits are listed in 
Table I. 
4.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 
The acceptance data package for the POS shall contain the cure date (by quarter) of each 
item containing materials requiring age control. At the expiration of the life specified 
in Table I, the following actions shall be taken: 
Code Action 
A The item will be carefully examined for cracks, flaws on 
excessive wear. If found to be free of defects, it will be 
proof pressure tested and reexamined. If still free of 
defects, it may be used for one year at which time the 
inspection will be repeated. 
Ham ilton _U 	 DE No.1 SPECIFICATION NO. REV7 3 0 3 0  
Standard A's . ..	 0 
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4.0 (Cont') 
Code 	 Action 
B 	 Items marked 'B' or-found to be defective will be 
replaced. 
The historical record in the acceptance data package will be updated to reflect 
the results of the age-control inspection and shall include the cure date of all 
replacement 	age -cbntrolled -materials. 
TABLE I 
AGE CONTROL MATERIALS LIST 
Item 
No. Name 
Material Requiring 
Age Control 
Minimum 
Life 
Inspection 
Code 
Cure-
Date 
Inspection Date 
-----------------------------------------­
10 Flow Compensating Bag Natural Latex 2 A 
19 Breathing Bag Conductive Nat'l Latex 2 A 
14 Mask Assembly Neoprene and 
Neoprene/Nat'l Rubber 
5 A 
15 Flexible Hose Neoprene 5 A 
12 Check Valve Ethylene Propylene 5 A 
NA Tubing Neoprene 5 A 
(Dn 
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1.0 SCOPE 
This specification establishes the requirements for complete identification and 
acceptance of the Prototype Portable Oxygen Subsystem (SVSK 90390) to be 
supplied to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
NASA 
NHB 5300.4 (ID) Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Provisions 
for the Space Shuttle Program
JSCM 5322 JSC Contamination Control Program Requirement 
Manual 
Drawings 
SVSK 90390 Portable Oxygen Subsystem 
SV 723020-2 Oxygen Fill Connector
 
Standards
 
Mil-0-27210 
 Oxygen Aviators Breathing, Liquid and Gas' 
Mil-P-27401 Propellant, Pressurizing Agent, Nitrogen 
3.0 REQJIREMENTS 
This section specifies performance and product configuration requirements of the 
Portable Oxygen Subsystem. 
3.1 Performance 
3. 1. 1 Proof Pressure 
The unit shall be capable of meeting the requirements of this specification after 
subjecting the high pressure circuit to a pressure of 15,773+138 KPa (2288±20 psig)
for five minutes with the shutoff valve open and subjecting the interstage to a pressure
of 689±69 KPa (100±10 psig) for five minutes. 
The unit shall be capable of meeting the requirements of this specification after subjecting
the breathing circuit to a pressure of 6.89=. 69 KPa (1-±. 1 psig). 
3. 1.2 Operational Requirements 
1 D 4/67HSF-755. 
U E IDENT NO. SPECIFICATION NO. REVHam ilton 
SV HS 7015Standard p7733
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3.1.2. 1 09 Pressure Gage Accuracy 
The 02 pressure'gage shall have an accuracy of L4% of full scale ,readina. 
3. 1.2.2 Interstage Pressure Gage Accuracy 
The interstage pressure gage shall have an accuracy of -4% of full scale reading. 
3. 1.2.3 Make-up Oxygen Supply Performance 
Pressure reducer shall maintain the interstage pressure at 231-:41 KPa (33. 5±6'psid) with 
with an inlet pressure of 689 KPa (100 psig) to 7,887 KPa- (1144 psig). With a supply 
pressure of 6205±69 KPa (900±L10 psig) the 02 flow to the mask shall be .22 Kg/hr
(1.5 ± lb/hr). With a breathing circuit pressure of 746 Pa (73 in H20) the flow through 
the demand regulator shall be less than 25 cc/hr. With the breathing circuit pressure 
of 995 Pa (-4 in,H20) the flow through the demand regulator shall be 3. 6 Kg/hr 
(8 lb/hr) minimum. The 02 inlet check valve -shallpermit less than 25 scc/min 
backflow when the downstream side is pressurized to 498 Pa (2. 0 in H20). 
3.1.2.4 Breathing Circuit Performance 
At a flow of 4.1 Kg/hr.( 9.1 lb/hr) the pressure drop from the mask to the cartridge 
inlet shall not exceed 348 Pa( 1.4 in H20) and the pressure drop from the-cartridge 
outlet to.the mask shall not exceed 298 Pa ( 1.2 in ft20). The exhalation relief 
valve shall crackat 124 Pa (0. 5 in H20) max. and shall reset at 50 Pa (0. 2 in H20) 
minimum & thepressure drop shall be.498 Pa (2. 0 in H20) maximum at an 02 flow 
of 65 LPM. With a backpressure of 249 Pa ( 1 in H20) the flow th'rough either the 
exhalation or inhalation check valve shall not-exceed 25 scc/min 02. 
3.1.2.5 External Leakage 
'3.1. 2. 5. 1 High Pressure Circuit 
With the bottle charged to 7887±138 KPa (1144±20 psig) and the shutoff valve,closed 
the external leakage shall not exceed 2.0 scc/ hr. With the bottle'charged to 7887±138 KPa (1144±20 psig) and the shutoff valve open the external leakage shalljnot exceed 20 cc/hr. ­
3. 1.2.5.2 Breathing Circuit 
With a breathing circuit pressure of-746 Pa (-3 inH2 0 ) the inward leakage shall not 
exceed 25 scc/mi. 
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3. 1.2.6 Cartridge/Canister Performance 
The LIOH cartridge shall contain a minimum of 0.5 Kg (I.I Ib) LIOH after charging. 
At a flow rate of 4. 1 Kg/hr (9. 1 ib/hr) the pressure drop from the canister inlet 
to outlet after installation of the cartridge shall not exceed 99 Pa (.4 in H20). 
The canister pressure indicator shall be visible at an internal pressure of 3.45 KPa 
(0. 5 psig). The canister cartridge assembly shall be sealed with an internal pressure 
of 13.8 KPa (2 paig). 
The external leakage of the sealed canister when pressurized to 13. 8 KPa (2 psig) 
shall not exceed. 15 cc/hr. 
3.2 Product Configuration 
3.2.1 Manufacturing Drawing 
The configuration of the Portable Oxygen Subsystem shall be in accordance with 
Hamilton Standard Drawing SVSK 90390 and the detail drawings. 
3.2.2 Government Furnished Property List 
The POS shall contain the following GFP hardware: 
P/N Part Name 
SV 723020-2 Oxygen Fill Connector 
4.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 
A Quality Assurance Program and a Reliability Program in accordance with NASA 
Document NHB 5300.4 (ID) as modified by contract NAS 9-14458 shall be required. 
4.1 Performance and Design Requirements 
Verification Cross Reference Index 
Manufacturing Drawing 3.2. 1 Pretest Inspection 4.2. 1 
Proof Pressure 3.1.1 Proof Pressure 4.2.2 
02 Pressure Gage Accuracy 3.1.2. 1 Makeup 02 Supply Perf. 4.2.3 
Interstage Pressure Gage Accuracy 3.1.2.2 it " " 4.2.3 
Accuracy 3.1.2.2 
" 4.2.3Makeup 02 Supply 

Performance 3.1.2.3
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4.1 (Cont'd) 
Requirements 'Verification 
Breathing Ciretit Breathing Circuit Perf. 4.2.4 
Performance 3.1.2.4 and Proof Pressuie 4.2.2 
External Leakage 3.1.2.5 External Leakage'4. 2.5 
Cartridge/Canister Cartridge/Canister 
Performance 3.1.2.6 Performance 4.2.6 
4.2 Tests/Verification 
The following tests shall be run on the prototype POS per PDA 7-015 to demonstrate 
the acceptability 6f the unit. To maintain the internal cleanliness of the unit during
testing, the gasesused for the test shall be filtered through a 15 absolute filter 
placed immediately upstream of the connections to the POS. Oxygen conforming to 
Mil-0-27210, Type I and nitrogen conforming to Mil-P-27401 Type Iare the only 
gases to be used for testing the POS. 
4.2.1 Pretest Inspection -
The Portable Oxygen Subsystem shall be inspected for compliance with the manufacturing
drawings. Assembly and subassembly inspection and manufacturing operation records 
shall be reviewed-for adequate completion of the operation and the records thereof. 
The quality records shall also be reviewed for completeness. All .material review 
action, to this point, must le completed. 
4.2.2 Proof Pressure 
The shutoff valve will-be in the open positioni and pressure will be 'upplied through the 
fill fittings. The pressure will be maintained at 15,773d138 KPa (2288-20 psig) for 
five minutes using nitrogen. Pressure will then be supplied to the interstage through 
a pressurization fitting on the pre ssure reducer. The interstage pressure will be 
maintained at 689;-±69. KPa (100±10 psig) for five minutes using nitrogen. Ambient 
conditions shall be room ambient pressure and 4.4 to 3800 (70±30 0 F). During the 
test, the gas will 'flowto the mask continuously. 
The breathing circuit relief valve will be capped and the breathing-circuit will be 
pressurized with nitrogen to 6.89±. 69 KPa (1E. 1 psig) for five minutes. The flow 
required to maintain a constant pressure shall not exceed 25 cc/min. 
HSF-755. 1D 4/67 
IDENT NO.J SPECIFICATION NO. REV 
StandardStandaI ... U...Od"A6:1 C 7330 [SV HS 7015 Ham ilton U 
WINDSOR LOCKS, CONNECTICUT 06096 PAGE 7 of 8 
4.2.3 Make-up 09 Supply Performance 
The shutoff valve shall be in the open position and oxygen shall be supplied through 
the fill fittings during the following tests: 
The supply pressure shall be set at pressures of 689-L69 KPa (100±10 psig) 
and 7887:L138 KPa (114420'psig). The 02 supply pressure gage shall agree 
with the rig gage within ±1102 KPa (160 psi). The interstage pressure gage 
shall agree with a rig pressure gage (connected to the pressure port on the 
pressure reducer) within ±27. 8 KPa (4.0 psi). The interstage pressure 
shall be 231±40 KPa (33.5±6 psid). The supply pressure will then be set at 
6205±69 KPa (900+10 psig). The flow to the mask shall be .227:±. 01 Kg/hr 
(0. 5±. 025 lb/hr). The breathing circuit pressure will be reduced 746 Pa 
(3 in H20) below ambient. The flow to vacuum required to maintain this 
pressure shall not exceed 25 scc/min. The breathing circuit pressure will 
then be decreased to 995 Pa (4 in H20) below ambient. The flow to the mask 
shall be 3.6 Kg/hr (8 lb/hr) minimum. The oxygen supply will be shut off 
and the system pressure will be decreased to zero. A mask pressure of 
498+50 Pa (2L.2 in 1120) will be established and the interstage pressure will 
be observed. The flow required to maintain the interstage pressure at zero 
shall not exceed 25 sec/min. The ambient condition shall be room ambient 
pressure and 4.4 to 380C (70±:30 0F). 
4.2.4 Breathing Circuit Performance 
With the canister removed from the POS, the pressure in the mask shall be increased 
until a flow of 4. 1 Kg/hr ( 9. 1 lb/hr) is obtained. The pressure drop between the 
mask and the canister inlet fitting shall not exceed 348 Pa ( 1.4 in H20). The 
mask pressure shall be decreased below ambient until a flow of 4. 1 Kg/hr 
(9. 1 lb/hr) is established.
 
The pressure drop between the canister outlet fitting and the mask shall not exceed
 
298 Pa ( 1.2 in H20). During this test the canister inlet fitting shall be capped.
 
With a pressure gage connected to the canister inlet fitting, the pressure in the mask 
shall be slowly increased until a flow of 65±1 1PM is obtained. 
The pressure difference between the canister inlet fitting pressure 
and ambient shall not exceed 498 Pa (2.0 in H20). The pressure at which flow is 
initiated shall be greater than 124 Pa (0. 5 in H20) and the pressure at which flow 
stops shall be greater than 50 Pa (0.2 in H20).­
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4.2.4 (Cont') 
A pressure of 249±25 Pa (1±. 1 in 1120) above ambient shall be established at the 
canister inlet fitting and flow to the mask will be collected. The flow shall be less 
than 25 scc/min. With the canister inlet fitting capped, the ma.sk pressure shall be 
increased 249=L25 Pa (1±. 1 in 1120) above ambient and flow to the canister outlet 
fitting will be collected. The flow shall be less than 25 scc/min. The test fluid 
to be used is oxygen and the ambient conditions shall be room ambient pressure and 
4.4 to 38 0 C (70-30 0 F). 
4.2.5 External Leakage (Prototype Unit Only) 
The system shall be charged to 7887±138 KPa (1144±20 psig) with nitrogen and all 
joints, couplings and fittings in the high pressure and interstage circuit shall be 
coated with an oxygen compatible leak test fluid. There shall be no evidence of 
leakage. The shutoff valve will be closed and the gas supply line will be disconnected. 
from the rig and submerged in water. The shutoff valve will be opened and the end 
of the supply line will be observed. The flow from the line shall not exceed 2 cc/hr. 
The canister shall be installed in the POS in the open condition. 
The pressure in the POS will be reduced 746 Pa (3 in H20) below ambient. The flow 
to vacuum required to maintain this pressure shall not exceed 25 scc/min. The 
ambient conditions shall be room ambient pressure and 4.4 to 3800 (70±30°F). 
4.2.6 Cartridge/Canister Performance 
The cartridge weight including preload pads shall be recorded prior to and after 
charging with LiOH. The weight increase due to LiOH shall be 0.2 Kg (1.1 lb) 
Minimum. The cartridge will be installed in the canister. A flow of 4.1 Kg/hr 
(9. 1 lb/hr) using 02 shall be established flowing from the canister inlet to the 
canister outlet. The pressure drop across the cartridge shall not exceed 99 Pa 
(.4 in H20). The canister pressure shall be increased to 3.45 KPa (0.5 psig) 
and then to 13.8 KPa (2.0 psig). The indicator shall be visible at 3.45 KPa (0.5 psig). 
At 13.8 KPa (2. 0 psig) the canister valve shall be closed. The sealed canister will 
be submerged in water for 30 minutes. There shall be no evidence of leakage. The 
ambient condition shall be room ambient pressure and 4.4 to 380C (70±300 F). 
4.2.7 Post Test Inspection 
After the POS has passed the sequence of tests, it shall have a complete, final visual 
inspection. The purpose of this inspection shall be to establish: the final conditions 
of the unit and to complete all operation records. 
PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY 
Requirements for preparation for delivery and shipment of the POS shall be in 
accordance with JSCM 5322. 
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1.0 	 INTRODUCTION
 
This document provides detailed procedures fot testing the Por­
table Oxygen Subsystem in accordance with the predelivery accep­
tance test plan, prescribeduin Section 4 of SVHS 7015, prior to
 
shipment to NASA.
 
2.0 	APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
 
The following documents of the exact revision shown form a part
 
of this document to the extent specified herein. In the event
 
of a conflict between the referenced documents and the test
 
proceduresospecified herein, these test procedures shall take
 
precedence.
 
Specifications
 
SVHS 7015 Portable Oxygen Subsystem Acceptance Test
 
Specification
 
HS 3150B, AM2 Processing, Testing, and Preservation of
 
Parts Subject to High Cleanliness Levels'
 
HS 1550D Process Specification for Cleanliness
 
Preservation and Handling of Products
 
Drawings
 
SVSK 90390 Portable Oxygen Subsystem
 
SV723020-2 Oxygen Fill Connector
 
Standards
 
MIL-O-27210D, AM2 Oxygen, Aviators Breathing, Liquid and Gas
 
MIL-P-27401C Propellant, Pressurizing Agent Nitrogen
 
MIL-STD-794B Parts and Equipment, Procedure for
 
March 1969 Packaging and Packing of
 
Other Publications
 
JSCM 5322A JSC Contamination Control Program
 
Requirements Manual
 
NHB 5300.4(lD) 	 Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and
 
Quality Provisions for the Space Shuttle
 
Program
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3.0 REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 Facility Requirements
 
Testing shall be performed in a contro±±ea area. The high pre ­
sure supply shal be cleaned to HS 3150 CD-3, and the supply gaE
 
shall be filtered through a 15.4( absolute filter. The breathinc
 
circuit instrumentation and connecting lines shall be cleaned
 
with freon or alcohol and shall be free of oil and visible con
 
taminants. The outside of the test unit shall be maintained
 
clean according to HS 155OCl.
 
3.2 Test Setups
 
Test setups and mechanical connections shall be as defined in
 
test procedures and as illustrated in the applicable test setu
 
schematics.
 
3.3 Test Medium
 
Test shall be conducted with the test stand serviced with oxygqr
 
per MIL-0-27210 Type 1 and nitrogen per MIL-P-27401 Type 1.
 
Supply pressures will be specified in the test procedures.
 
3.4 Test Sequence
 
The test program shall be conducted in the following sequence:
 
Sequence Test Paragraph
 
1 Pretest Inspection 7.1
 
2 Proof Pressure Test 7.2
 
See Note 1 Make Up 02 Supply Performance 7.3
 
See Note 1 :Breathing Circuit Performance 7.4
 
5 ,-External Leakage 7.5
 
See Note 2 XNCartridge/Canister Performance 7.6
 
7 Post Test Inspection 7.7
 
Note 1 - These tests may be conducted in any sequence after com­
pletion of the proof pressure test.
 
Note 2 - This test may be conducted in any sequence.
 
4.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE
 
4.1 Inspection
 
Testing shall be conducted under SSD Inspection surveillance.
 
-Verification of test results shall be indicated by inspection
 
stamps on each sheet where an asterisk (*) appears in the
 
"inspector" block.
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4.2 Component Schematic
 
The Portable Oxygen Subsystem schematic is shown in Figure 1.
 
4.3 Calibration and Accuracy Requirements
 
All test gages, regulators, flow meters, et cetera shall have
 
valid calibration certification with standards traceable to the
 
National Bureau of Standards prior to use. The test equipment
 
has 	certain gages which are used as indicators only and are not
 
used in performance of these tests. These items do not require
 
current certification.
 
4.4 List of Equipment
 
The equipment required for this test program is defined on each'
 
test setup schematic.
 
4.5. Test Data
 
A. 	Data shall be recorded in the spaces provided in the applic­
able data sheets.
 
B. 	The dash number, serial number, date of test, and test per­
sonnel shall be recorded on each data sheet in the spaces
 
provided.
 
C. 	Deviations to the procedures specified in this document shall
 
be recorded on the test sheets.
 
D. 	The project engineer shall summarize the test events at the
 
completion of the tests, identifying any test events which
 
are other than ordinary.
 
E. 	The completed data sheets and the applicable revision of the
 
test procedure shall be retained and included in the acceptance
 
data package for the unit tested.
 
4.6 Failure Reporting
 
A RDR containing a test description, actual test conditions, and
 
results shall be prepared for any test result which does not com­
ply 	with requirements. All RDR's shall be closed prior to deliv­
ery of the unit.
 
5.0 TESTS/VERIFICATION
 
The 	following tests shall be run on the prototype POS to demon­
strate the acceptability of the unit following the procedures
 
defined in Section 7.0.
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5.1 Pretest Inspection
 
The Portable Oxygen Subsystem shall be inspected for compliance
 
with the manufacturing drawings. Assembly and subassembly in­
spection and manufacturing operation records shall be reviewed
 
for adequate completion of the operation and the records thereof.
 
The quality records shall also be reviewed for completeness. All
 
.material review action, to this point, must be completed.
 
5.2 Proof Pressure
 
The shutoff valve will be in the open position, and pressure will
 
be supplied through the fill fittings. The pressure %ill be
 
maintained at 15,773 + 138 KPa (2,288 + 20 psig) for five minutes
 
using nitrogen. Pressure will then be-supplied to the interstage
 
through a pressurization fitting on the pressure reduder. The
 
interstage pressure will,be maintained at 689 + 69 KPa, (100 + 10
 
psig) for five minutes using nitrogen. AmbienE conditions sHall
 
be room ambient pressure and 4.4 to 380C (70 + 300F).. During the
 
test, the gas will flow to the mask continuously.
 
The breathing circuit relief valve will be capped, ande'the breath­
ing circuit will be pressurized with nitrogen to 6.89 + .69 KPa
 
(1 + .1 psig) for five minutes. The flow required to maintaih a
 
constant pressure,shall not exceed 25 cc/min.
 
5.3 Makeup 02 Supply Performance
 
The shutoff valve shall be in the open position, and oxygen shall
 
be supplied through the fill fittings during the folloing tests:
 
The supply pressure shall be set at pressures of 689 +
 
69 KPa (100 + 10 psig) and 7,887 + 138 KPa (1,144 + 2U
 
psig).. The U2 supply pressure gage shall agree wi:h
 
the rig gage within +1,102 KPa (160 psi). The inter­
stage pressure gage shall agree with a rig pressure gage
 
(connected to the pressure port on the pressure reducer)
 
within +27.8 'Pa (4.0 psi). The interstage pressure
 
shall b 231 + 40 KPa (33.5 + 6 psid). The supply pres­
sure will theE be set at 6,2U5 + 69 KPa (900 + 10 psig).
 
The.flow to the mask shall be .727 + .01 Kg/hF (Oh5 +
 
.025 lb/hr). §The breathing circuit-pressure will be­
reduced 746 Pa (3 in H20) below ambient. The flow to
 
vacuum required to maintain this pressure shall ndt
 
exceed 25 scc/min. The breathing circuit pressure will
 
then be decreased to 995 Pa (4 in H20) below ambient.
 
The flow to the mask shall be 3.6 Kg/hr (8 lb/hr) min­
imum. The oxygen supply will be shut off, and the sys­
tem pressure will be decreased to zero. *A mask pressure
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5.3 (Continued)
 
of 498 + 50 Pa (2 + .2 in H20) will be established, and
 
the interstage preisure will be observed. The flow re­
quired to maintain the interstage pressure at zero shall
 
not exceed 25 scc/min. The ambient condition shall be
 
room ambienC pressure and 4.4 to 380C (70 + 300 F).
 
5.4 Breathing Circuit Performance-

With the canister removed from the POS, the pressure in the mask
 
shall be increased until a flow of 4.1 Kg/hr (-9.1 lb/hr) is ob­
tained. The pressure drop between the mask and the canister in­
let fitting shall not exceed 348. Pa (1.4 in H20). The-mask pres­
sure shall be decreased below ambient until a flow of 4.1 Kg/hr
 
(9.1 lb/hr) is established. The pressure drop between the can­
ister outlet fitting and the mask shall not exceed 298 Pa (1.2 
in H20). During this test, the canister inlet fitting shall be 
capped. With a pressure gage connected to the canister inlet 
fitting, the pressure in the mask shall be slowly increased until 
a flow of 65 + 1 1PM is obtained.' The pressure difference be­
tween the canister inlet fitting pressure and ambient shall not 
exceed 498 Pa (2.0 in H20). The pressure at which flow is initi­
ated shall be greater than 124 Pa (0.5 in-H20), and the pressure 
at which flow stops shall be greater than 50 Pa (0.2 in H20).
 
A pressure of 249 + 25 Pa (1 + .1 in.H20) above ambient shall be
 
established at the-canister inlet fitting, and flow td the mask
 
will be collected. The-flow shall be less than 25 sdc/min. With
 
the canister inlet fitting capped, the mask pressure shall be in­
creased 249 + 25 Pa (1 + .1 in H20) Above ambient, ard flow to
 
the canister-outlet fitting will be collected. The flow shall be
 
less than 25 scc/min. The test fluid to be used is oxygen, and
 
the ambient conditions shall be ro6m ambient pressure and 4.4 to
 
380C (70 + 300F).
 
5.5 External Leakage (Prototype Unit Only)
 
The system shall be charged to 7,887 + 138 KPa (1,144 + 20 psig)
 
with nitrogen, and all joints, couplings, and fittings-in the
 
high pressure and interstage circuit shall be coated with an.oxy­
gen compatible leak test fluid. There shall be no evidence of
 
leakage. The shutoff valve will be closed, and the gas supply
 
Line will be disconnected from the rig and submergediin water.
 
The shutoff valve will be opened, and the end of the supply line
 
will be observed. The flow from the line shall not exceed 2
 
cc/hr.
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5.5 (Continued)
 
The canister shall be installed in the POS in the open condition.
 
The pressure in the POS will be reduced 746 Pa (3 in H20) below
 
ambient.' The flow to vacuum required to maintain this pressure
 
shall not exceed 25 scc/min. The ambient conditions shall be
 
room ambient pressure and 4.4 to 380C (70 + 300F).
 
5.6 Cartridge/canister Performance
 
The cartridge weight including preload pads shall be recorded
 
prior to and after charging with LiOH. The weight increase due
 
to.LiOH shall be 0.2 Kg (1.1 lb) minimum. The cartridge will be
 
installed in the canister. A flow of 4.1 Kg/hr (9.1 lb/hr) using
 
02 shall be established flowing from the canister inlet to the
 
canister outlet. The pressure drop across the cartridge shall
 
not exceed 99 Pa (.4 in H20). The canister pressure shall be in­
creased to 3.45 KPa (0.5 psig) and then to 13.8 KPa (2.0 psig).
 
The indicator shall be visible at 3.45 KPa (0.5 psig). At 13.8
 
KPa (2.0 psig) the canister valve shall be closed. The sealed 
canister will be submerged in water for 3'0 minutes. There shall 
be no evidence of leakage. The ambient condition shall be room 
ambient pressure and 4.4 to 380C (70 + 300F). 
5.7 Post Test Inspection
 
After the POS has passed the sequence of tests, it shall have a
 
complete, final visual inspection. The purpose of this inspec­
tion shall be to establish the final conditions of the unit and
 
to complete all operation records.
 
6.0 PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY
 
Requirements for preparation for delivery and shipment of the POS
 
shall be in accordance with JSCM 5322.
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Hamilton U MODEL ITEM NO SER. Nb 
CHG DATE P/E Q/E Standard A® ITEM oE. 
ORIG SLS ACCEPTANCE TEST TESTSPEC. NG. NTR. AMM. O. 
A OPERATIONS/LOG SHEET PART NO. NO. OF.NT. 
B 7.0 TEST PROCEDURE 
C Testing shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures defined 
herein with results recorded on the applicable log sheet. 
D 
D _Prior to initiation of testing, the cleanliness of the rig/setup 
shall be verified. 
E 
F 
-F 
High pressure supply cleaned per HS 3150 CD-3 
Breathing circuit rig and instrumentation free 
G of oil and visible contaminants 
cThe sequence of operation shall be recorded on a Hamilton Standard 
H Historical Log (HSF-1843). Any discrepancies shall be recorded on 
a Hamilton Standard Unit History (HSF-454C). 
J 
K 
M 
N 
0 
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REF. SPEC. PARA. ROOM TEMP (-F) Hamilton Standard ....... U EO.flc,rc.o.. SER. NO.TES..AT 
CORR BAR. 
5EST1RG 
PRE$. (IN.HG) 
SLS ACCEPTANCE TEST 
TEST AT 
OPERATIONS/LOG SHEET 
7.1 	 Pretest Inspection
 
7.1.1 
Examine the item with respect to surface finish, coating, visual defects and compliance

with drawing SVSK 90390. 
 Do not 	disassemble the unit to do a visual examination.
 
7.1.2 	Verify by review of cleaning records that high pressure circuit complies with HS 3150 CD-3
 
and that the breathing circuit complies with HS 3150 CE-0.
 
7.1.3 	Verify that all assembly operations are complete and that all shop orders have been
 
completed and signed off.
 
7.1.4 	 Using the setup shown in Figure 7.1, determine the dry weight of the unit and record in
 
the space provided.
 
Unit
 
Complies High Pressure 
 All Assembly Operations

With Circuit Cleaned Breathing Circuit Completed And All
Print to HS 3150 CD-3 Cleaned to HS 3150 CE-0 Documentation Completed Weight
 
es 	 Actual lbs
 
o 	
_Required 
 NA/
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U 	 SERt NO. PA.71 REF. SPC. PARA. ROOM TEMP (-F) 
Hamilton Standard .... 	 A CORR BAR. PRES. (IN.HG) 	 AsT-TATE 
TEST RG SLS ACCEPTANCE TEST 
OPERATIONS/LOG SHEET 
7.2 Proof Pressure
 
7.2.1 Supply Circuit
 
Remove the pressurization fitting from the pressure reducer and install the unit in the
 
test setup shown in Figure 7.2.
 
With the system shutoff valve open, adjust PR-i to obtain a pressure of 100 + 10 psig at
 
the interstage regulator and adjust PR-2 to obtain a pressure of 2,288 + 20 Fsig at the
 
fill connector. Hold these pressure levels for 5 minutes.
 
Decrease PR-1 and PR-2 to return the system to ambient pressure.
 
there shall be no evidence of permanent deformation.
 
CAUTION
 
During this test, gas will flow from the small hose in the mask. 
Do not block this flow
 
as this could damage the unit.
 
Supply Interstage
 
Pressure (P2) Pressure (P1) Duration
 
Required 2,288 :L 201Psig 100 + 	 10 Psig 5 Min. Minimum 
Actual
 
Freedom from permanent deformation 	 Yes No
 
CAUTION
 
SOP RATOROO 
The unit shall be installed in a proof 	pressure chamber for this test.
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7.2.2 	 Breathing Circuit
 
Cap the exhalation relief valve and set up the unit as shown,in Figure 7.3 with V-3
 
closed and V2 open.
 
Using PR-I, increase the pressure to 1 + .1 psig, adjust V2 to maintain P1 constant,
 
and hold for five minutes.
 
Record the flow required to maintain the pressure at a constant level.
 
Shut off the gas supply (Vl) and open V3 to vent the unit.
 
There shall be no permanent deformation, and the flow required to maintain the pressure
 
at a constant level shall not exceed 25 cc/min.
 
Pressure Flow
 
P1 FR-I Duration
 
Required 1 ± .1 Psig 25 cc/Min Max. 5 Min. Minimum
 
Actual
 
Freedom from permanent deformation Yes No
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7.3.2 	 Orifice Performance
 
With the unit setup as shown in Figure 7.5, adjust PR-i to obtain a pressure (P-i) of
 
900 + 10 psig and collect the flow to the mask.
 
The flow shall be 2,850 + 143 scc/min.
 
After this test, decrease PR-i and allow the pressure to return to room ambient.
 
CAUTION
 
During this test, gas will flow from the small hose in the mask. 
Do not 	block this flow
 
as this could damage the unit.
 
Supply
Pressure (PI) 	 Flow
 
Required 900 L 10 psig 2,850 ± 143 scc/min 
Actual 
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7.3.3 Demand Regulator Performance
 
Set the unit up as shown in Figure 7.5. 
 Using PR-i1 increase the supply pressure (PI)
to 900 + 10 psig. Adjust valve V-I to obtain a pressure (P2) of 2 - 2.5 in H20 below
 
ambient-and record the flow required to maintain this pressure.
 
NOTE
 
This test checks leakage of a demand regulator which opens at a pressure slightly below
 
the test pressure (,-3" H20 below ambient). Therefore, reduce the breathing circuit pres­
sure slowly and do not go below the 2.5 in H20 limit.
 
CAUTION
 
During this test, gas will flow from the small hose in the mask. 
Do not block this flow
as this could damage the unit.
 
The flow (FR-I) required to maintain the system below ambient shall not exceed 25 scc/min.

Close V-i.
 
Adjust V-2 to obtain a pressure (Pj) 6f 4 to 4.5 in H20 below ambient and record the flow
 
(FR-2) required to maintain this pressure.
 
The flow shall be 8 lb/hr minimum.
 
Reduce the supply pressure 
(PR-i) to room ambient and close valve V-2 allowing breathing
 
circuit to return to room ambient pressure.
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7.3.3 (Continued) 
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7.3.4 Check Valve Performance
 
Set up the unit as shown in Figure 7.7. Using PR-i, increase the mask pressure (PI) to
2 + .2 in H2) and observe the flow compensating bag for 5 minutes minimum. The bag shall
 
,noE become fully extended in less than 5 minutes.
 
Time to

Mask Pressure Test Duration Bag Extended
 
Required 
 2 _+ .2 in H20 5 min Minimum >5 Minutes
 
kctul
 
NOTE: Test may be discontinued after 25 minutes even if bag is not extended.
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7.4 Breathing Circuit Performance
 
7.4.1 Exhalation/Inhalation Resistance
 
Remove the cartridge/canister assembly from the PQS and set up as shown in Figure 7.8
 
withV2 and V3 closed and P1 set at 1 psig.
 
Adjust V-i to obtain a flow of 9.1 + .1 lb/hr and observe the pressure at the mask.
 
The mask pressure shall not exceed 1.4 in H20.
 
Close V-I and V4. Cap the cartrdige inlet. Open V3 and adjust V2 to obtain a flow of
 
9.1 + .1 lb/hr and observe the pressure of the mask.
 
Theamask pressure shall not be lower than -1.2 in H20.
 
Exhalation Flow Mask Pressure Inhalation Flow Mask Pressure 
Required 9.1 t .l lb/hr 1.4" H20 Max 9.1 + .1 lb/hr >-1.2"11H20 
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7.4.3 Check Valve Performance
 
Set up the unit as shown in Figure 7.10.
 
Adjust PR-1 to obtain a pressure of 1 + .1 in H20 and collect the flow at the mask. 
The
 
floW shall 'hot exceed 25 sdc/min.
 
Decrease PR-I.
 
Revise the set up as shown in Figure 7.11.
 
Adjust PR-i to obtain a pressure of 1 + .1 in H20 and collect the flow at the canister
 
outlet. The flow shall not exceed 25 9cc/min.
 
Decrease PR-I.
 
Canister Inlet 
 Mask Inlet Flow at
Pressure (PI) Flow at Mask Pressure (PI) Canister Qutle
 
Required 1 + .1 in H20 25 cc/min Max 1 + .1 in H20 25,cc/min Max 
Actual 
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7.5 	 External Leakage
 
7.5.1 	 High Pressure Supply
 
Set up the unit as shown in Figure 7.12 and adjust PR-I to obtain a pressure of
 
1,144 + 20 psig.
 
CAUTION
 
During this test, gas will flow from the small hose in the mask. 
Do not block this flow
 
as this could damage the unit.
 
Coat all joints, fittings, and couplings with oxygen compatible leak test fluid and
 
observe.
 
There shall be no evidence of leakage.
 
Close the POS shutoff valve and decrease P1 to room ambient pressure.
 
Disconnect the fill connector and connect the line to the leakage setup.
 
Open the POS valve and observe leakage for 1 hour.
 
The leakage shall not exceed 2 scc/hr.
 
Supply	 I Check
Pressure P1 Visual Leakage Valve Leakage 
Required 1,144 + 20 psig No Visible Leaks 2 scc/hr Max. 
Actual
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7.5.2 	Breathing Circuit
 
Set up the unit as shown in Figure 7.13.
 
Adjust V-I to obtain a pressure (P-i) of 3 + .1 in H20 below ambient. Adjust the valve
 
as required to maintain the pressure at a c~nstant value, and after 20 minutes record the
 
flow (FM-I).
 
The flow shall be less than 25 scc/min.
 
Pressure (PI) Flow 
jRequired -3 + .1 in H20 25 scc/min Maximun 
Actual
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7.6 Cartridge/Canister Performance
 
7.6.1 LiOH Charge
 
Cartridge weight prior to charge lbs (include screws, nuts, washers, and preload

pads).
 
Cartridge weight after charge lbs. Weight increase due to LiOH lbs spec 1.1
 
lb minimum.
 
7.6.2 Cartridge/Canister Pressure Drop
 
Set up the unit as shown in Figure 7.14 with Vi and V3 closed and V2, V4, and V5 open.
 
W Using PR-1, set P3 at 2 + .1 psig and then set Vl to obtain a flow of 9.1 + 1 lb/hr.

L3 The pressure drop (PI) sifall not exceed .4 in H20.
 
Supply
 
Pressure P3 Flow FM-I Pressure Drop PI
 
Required 2 t .1 psi4 9.1 ± .1 lb/hr <.4 in H20
 
Actual
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7.6.3 Indicator Performance and Leakage
 
Continuing from the previous test, reduce P3 to 0 psig, close V2, V4, and V5 and open
 
V3 and Vj.
 
Observe the indicator on the side of the canister. The green should not be visible.
 
Increase P3 to .5 + .05 psig using PR-I and observe the indicator. The green should be
 
visible.
 
Increase P3 to 2.0 + .1 psig using PR-l and close the canister sealing piston.
 
Reduce PR-1, open V2 and remove the canister away from the setup. Verify that the green

indicator is still visible and submerge the assembly in water and observe for 30 minutes.
 
There shall be no evidence of leakage. Remove the canister assembly from the water and
 
blow dry using N2.
 
Indicator 
Status Indicator Piston Indicator 
at 0 Psig P3 Status P3 Status P3 Status Leakage 
Required Not 
Visible 
.5±.05 psig 
. .-
Visible 2.0±.l psig Sealed 0 psia Visible No Bubbles 
in30 Min. 
ctual
 
OPERATOR
 
INSPECTOR
 
HS- 1390 5/67 
REF. SPEC. PARA. 
5.7TESTR 
ROOM 
CORR 
TEMP (-F) 
BAR. PRES. (,.HG)TEST 
___PDA 
HSE. 
SLS ACCEPTANCE 
OPERATIONS/LOG 
TEST 
SHEET 
NO. 
DATE 
7015 
7.7 Post Test Inspection 
Unit free of visual defects not previously accepted. 
PO dry and in accordance with HS1550 P1. 
Canister assembly dry and in accordance with HS1550 Pl. 
All test completed and all records complete. 
Yes No 
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1.0 	 INTRODUCTION
 
1.1 	 Purpose
 
This document defines the procedure to be utilized in conducting
 
the Portable Oxygen Subsystem (POS) unmanned development test
 
program.
 
1.2 	 Scope
 
This document outlines and describes the items to be tested, tes
 
conditions and objectives, test setups, performance requirements
 
and reporting requirements.
 
1.3 	 Test Objective
 
The objective of the test program is to verify that the POS com­
plies with the performance requirements of the POS specification
 
CSD-SH-025 and to verify that the unit is safe for manned usage.
 
1.4 	 Description of Test Item
 
The test item is the Portable Oxygen Subsystem-which is defined
 
schematically in Figure 1. The test unit is defined by drawing
 
SVSK 90390.
 
2.0 	APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
 
Drawings
 
SVSK 90390 Portable Oxygen Subsystem
 
SVSK 90329 Breather Assembly
 
Standards
 
MIL-O-27210 Oxygen Aviators Breathing, Liquid and Gas
 
Specifications
 
CSD-SH-025 Specification for Design and Performance
 
Requirements for Shuttle Portable Oxygen
 
Subsystem (Prototype Only)
 
HS 	3150 Cleanliness Levels, High ....... Processing,
 
Testing and Preservation of Parts Subjected
 
to .....
 
UFLOW 	 0~02 RESERVOIR 

MASX COMPENSATING 	 -
 C 
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PRESSURE 5GAGE 

CHECKPRESSURE
 
VALVE 	 REUC
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FIGURE 1 - PORTABLE OXYGEN SUBSYSTEM 
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STECHNOLOGIES 
3.0 TEST SEQUENCE
 
Sequence Test Test Number
 
1 Examination of Product 5.1
 
2 Mission Test Denitrogenization Simulation 5.2
 
3 Examination of Product 5.1
 
4 Mission Test Rescue Simulation 5.3
 
4.0 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
 
4.1 Rigor
 
The test program shall be conducted under the direction of the
 
cognizant project engineer. Hamilton Standard inspection shall
 
be on a surveillance basis only. Any changes to the approved
 
test plan will be coordinated with NASA.
 
4.2 Reporting
 
The results of the test program will be included in the monthly
 
progress reports.
 
4.3 Control of the Test Item
 
It shall be the responsibility of the project engineer to insure
 
that the historical log sheets reflect all operations performed
 
on the test article during the test program.
 
4.4 Equipment Logs (Test Logs)
 
The test operator shall obtain sufficient data to verify that the
 
test conditions and environmental conditions have been controlled
 
as specified herein. This log will be maintained by the test
 
operator(s). In general, the log shall include, but not be lim­
ited to, the following data:
 
a. Test Title and Procedure Section Number
 
b. Date
 
c. Environmental Conditions
 
d. Test Operator
 
e. Test Equipment
 
f. Notes and Comments
 
g. Test Results
 
-4.5 Environmental Requirements
 
Unless otherwise specified, testing shall be conducted at local
 
ambient temperatures and barometric pressure. Correction shall
 
be made to provide agreement with the temperature and pressure
 
calibration of the instruments.
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4.6 Cleanliness Requirements
 
The 'supply gas shall be filtered through a 15 micron absolute
 
filter. The high pressure supply shall be'cleaned to HS 3150
 
CD-3. The breathing circuit instrumentation and connecting lines
 
shall be cleaned with freon and shall 'be free of oil and visible
 
.contaminants.
 
4.7 Gas Sampling
 
A gas sample will be taken from the mask area during each run.
 
These samples wtll :be analyzed to verify that the gas inspired'
 
from the POS is 'freeof toxicants in harmful concentrations
 
(permissible concentrations are listed in Table I). 'The gas
 
sample cylinders will be GFE.
 
4.8 Instrumentation
 
The instrumentation required for this test is shown in Figures 2
 
and 3 and listed in Table II. The surface temperature thermo­
couples will be located as specified by engineering and will be
 
attached with a thermally conductive epoxy. A Bristol Recorder
 
or equivalent shall be used to record all temperature readouts.
 
4.9 Test Gas
 
The test gas will be a mixture of oxygen per MIL-0-27210 and
 
carbon dioxide as follows:
 
Metabolic Load 

633KJ/Hr (600 Btu/Hr) 

844KJ/Hr (800 Btu/r) 

1160KJ/Hr (l,100-Btu/Hr) 

1582KJ/Hr (1,500 Btu/Hr) 

844KJ/Hr (800 Btu/Hr) (Rescue) 

4.10Breathing Simulation
 
The pulse flow device 

MetabolicLoad 

633KJ/Hr (600 Btu/Hr) 

844KJ/Hr (800 Btu/Hr) 

1160KJ/Hr (1,100 Btu/Hr) 

1582KJ/Hr (1,500 Btu/Hr) 

844KJ/Hr (800 Btu/Hr) (Rescue) 

Bottle
 
Mixture Number
 
18 + .5% by Vol. C02 in 02 1
 
24 T .5% by Vol. C02 in 02 2
 
34 T.5% by Vol. CO2 in 02 3
 
48 T .5% by Vol. CO2 in 02 4
 
29 T .5% by Vol. CO2 in 02 5
 
(SVSK 90329) will be set as follows:
 
. Test 
Total Stroke, Rate Cond. 
0.77+0.05 in, 12+0.2 cpm 1 
1.0270.05 in, 12+0.2 opm 2 
1.4 T0.05 in, 12+0.2 cpm 3 
1.4 TO.05 in, 16736+0.2 cpm 4 
0.7770.05 in, 4.8+072 cpm 5 
HAMILTON STANDARD 11, o POS-P-I %f MLOIEST. 
4.11 Failure Reporting
 
A RDR containing a test description, actual test conditions, and
 
test results shall be prepared for any test result which does not
 
meet requirements. All RDR's must be cleared before delivery of
 
the unit.
 
5.0 TEST PROCEDURE
 
5.1 Examination of Product
 
Examine the unit to verify the presence of a fresh cartridge and
 
that all instrumentation hookups are proper. Set up the system
 
as shown in Figure 2 and evacuated to 3 in. H20 below ambient to
 
verify pressure integrity. The flow to vacuum required to main­
tain a constant pressure shall not exceed 25. scc/min. Record
 
data on log sheet 6.1.
 
5.2 Mission Test - Denitrogenization Simulation
 
After setting the breather stroke and rate per test condition 2
 
(reference paragraph 4.10), set up the unit as shown in Figure 3.
 
Turn on all instrumentation line heaters. During this test,
 
maintain the lines in the mask area at approximately 120OF and
 
the lines in the canister area at approximately 180OF. Record
 
the weight of the test gas bottles No. 2 (800 Btu/hr), No. 3
 
(1,100 Btu/hr), and No. 4 (1,500 Btu/hr) as installed in the test
 
setup. Turn on the bellows heat lamp and adjust the variac to
 
establish a temperature of 98-99OF within the ambient box. Acti­
vate all C02 sensors and verify consistent readings. Verify that
 
the 02 and N2 monitors are reading values consistent with room
 
air. Turn on the temperature recorder and verify all pickups are
 
operational. With Vl closed, establish a pressure on P1 of 900
 
+ 20 psig using test bottle No. 2 (800 Btu/hr). Open V2 and
 
allow steam to enter the breather plenum until the dew point in
 
the plenum is 96-970F, then close valve V-2.
 
Caution: Do not permit the dew point in the plenum to exceed
 
980F.
 
Open V1 and turn on the breather. After five minutes record all
 
data required by the log sheet (6.2). After 30 minutes of opera­
tion, record all data then shut off flow to the two lira C02
 
readouts. Maintain these conditions for a total of two hours and
 
42 minutes recording all data every 30 minutes. (Turn on flow to
 
the liras two minutes before reading and shut off flow after com­
pleting the readings.) After the two hour and 30 minute reading,
 
draw a gas sample from the plenum and seal it in the GFE gas sam­
ple bottle. After the two hours and 42 minutes, close V1 and
 
shut off the breather. Switch to gas bottle No. 3 and reset the
 
breather per test condition 3. Open V1 and restart the breather.
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5.2 (Continued)
 
Caution: Allow no more than one minute for change in test
 
conditions.
 
During this test, TCG6 should be within 5°F of TCG5. If
Note: 

needed, the breathing bag may be heated using a heat lamp' If
 
heat is added, all areas except the bag must be shielded from the
 
heat lamp.
 
Record all data after restarting and then record all data again
 
before completing 15 minutes at this test condition.- Close V1
 
and stop the brdAther. Switch to' sample bottle No. 4 and reset
 
the breather pet test condition 4. Open V1 and restart the
 
After
breather. Wait one minute then quickly record all data. 

a total of three minutes, record the cartridge outlet and the
 
mask inlet C02 level and close Vl and stop the breather. Reset
 
to the initial test gas and breather conditions and testart the
 
test. Maintain these conditions until the mask inlet C02 level
 
exceeds 15 mm Hg. Close Vl and stop the breather. Initiate flow
 
of dry nitrogen at the plenum and allow it to flow until all dew
 
pointers indicate a low (< 400F), consistent dew p6it. Complete
 
shutdown of system.
 
During the first three hours of operation, TCG2 shall not exceed
 
1100 F, DP2 shall not exceed 1000 F, and outside surface tempera­
tures shall not exceed 1130 F. At 800 Btu/hr the cartridge outlet
 
C02 shall not exceed 7.6 mm Hg, and at 1,100 Btu/hr and above the
 
cartridge outlet C02 shall not exceed 15 mm Hg. The N2 level in
 
the plenum shall be less than 5% within 10 minutes.
 
5.3 Mission Test - Rescue Simulation
 
After installatibn of a fresh cartridge and completion of exam­
ination of product, install the unit in the setup-defined by
 
Figure 3 and repeat the previous test except-set the breather per
 
Maintain these conditions for
condition-1 and Use bottle No. 1. 

two hours then close V1 and stop the breather. Adjust P3 to 43
 
+ 1 psia and set breather to condition 5. Open V3 and restart 
The breather. Maintain this condition until the C02 partial
 
pressure exceeds.7.6 mm Hg. During the first three hours of
 
operation, TCG2 'shall not exceed 1100 F, DP2 shall not exceed
 
100 0F, outside surface temperature shall not exceed 1130F, and
 
the C02 level shall not exceed 7.6 mm Hg. The N2 level in the
 
plenum shall be iess than 5% within 10 minutes-.
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TABLE I
 
HUMAN TOLERANCES TO VARIOUS GASES AND VAPORS
 
Concentrations in Parts of Substance per
 
Million Parts of Ambient Atmospheric Air
 
by Volume
 
Substance 

Ammonia 

Amyl Acetate 

Benzone 

Butyl Acetate 

Carbon Disulfide 

Carbon Monoxide 

Carbon Tetrachloride 

Chlorine 

Dichloroethyl Ether 

Dichlorodifluoromethane 

Ether 

Ethyl Acetate 

Ethyl Alcohol 

Ethylene Dichloride 

Formaldehyde 

Gasoline 

Hydrogen Chloride 

Hydrogen Cyanide 

Hydrogen Fluoride. 

Hydrogen Sulfide 

Methane 

Methyl Bromide 

Methyl Chloride 

Nitric Oxide 

Nitrogen Dioxide 

Ozone 

Phenol 

Phosgene 

Styrene 

Sulfur Dioxide 

Toluene 

Trichlorethylene 

Maximum Allowabl
 
Concentration
 
100
 
200
 
100 
200
 
20
 
100
 
50
 
1
 
15
 
100,000
 
400
 
400
 
1,000
 
100
 
10
 
500
 
10
 
20
 
3
 
20
 
10,000
 
20
 
100
 
25
 
25
 
0.05
 
5
 
1
 
4-00
 
10
 
200
 
200
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0r M1CHOWLiESs-
Location 

Plenum 

Mask 

Hose/Regin' 

Hx Interface 

Cartridge 

Inlet 

Cartridge 

Outlet 

Gas 

Temperatures 

Skin 

Temperatures 

TABLE'II
 
INSTRUMENTATIQN
 
Parameter 

Gas Temp(l) 

02 

N2 

Dew Point(l) 

Gas Temp(2) 

Dew Point(2) 

Gas Temp(4') 

Co(3) 

C02(2) 

Dew'Point(,3) 

t02(l) 

Dew Point(4) 

Supply Gas(3) 

Bag Inlet(5,) 

Bag Outlet(6) 

Cartridge Outlet(7) 

Mask Visor(l) 

Regen Hx Mask Side(2) 

Regen Hx Bag Side(3) 

Bag Inlet Duct(4) 

Relief Valve Duct(5) 

Cartridge Inlet(6) 

Canister(3) (7,8,9)

Cartridge Outlet(10) 

Back Panel Outside(l1) 

kadiati6n Grid(12) 

Cover(13) 

Range Accuracy
 
32-300OF + 20F 
0-100% T 2% 
0-100% & 0-20% T 2%
 
32-120OF T 20F
 
32-300°F + 20F 
32-120O F W 20 F 
32-300OF + 20F 
0-20 mmHg T .1% 
0-40 mmHg + 1 mmHg 
32-180OF + 29F 
0-4,0 mmHg + 1 mmHg
 
32-180OF T 20F
 
32-300°F + 20F
 
32-300°F T 20F
 
32-300°F T 20F
 
32-300°F + 20F
 
32-3000F + 20F
 
32-300OF T 20F
 
32-300OF T 20F
 
32-300OF T 20F
 
32-300QF T 20F
 
32-300OF T 20F
 
32'-300OF T 20F
 
32-300OF T 20F
 
32-300°F + 20F 
32-300OF. T 20F 
32-300OF F 20F 
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02 
Instrument 

DP(1) + DP(2) 

DP(3) + DP(4) 

N2 

C02(1) + C02(2) 

CO 2 (3) 

POS INSTRUMENTATION 

Manufacturer Model Range 
EG&G 992 0-120OF 
Cambridge Systems 
(Now EG&G)5 
108 0-180 
Westinghouse 209P 0-100% 
Med Science Elect. 300AR 0-100% 
80-100% 
60-80% 
40-60% 
20-40% 
0-20% 
M.S.A. Lira 300 
Beckman LB-I 0-1% C02 

1-10% C02 

Accuracy 

+ i9F 
+ 1°F 
+ 1.5% 

+ 1% FS 
T 1% FS 
+ 1% FSI 
T 1% FS 
T 1% FS 
+ 1% FS
 
.3 rnmHg 

.1% 

I
 
Response Time z
 
30 F/Sec
 
1°F/Sec 
 I 
1 Sec
 
Not Specified
 
90% of Reading
 
in 5 Sec
 
90% FS in 0.1
 
Sec
 
0 
VAC 
we1 
Pi\
 
FM-lccMN Co - 100 CC/MIN i0+ 2% FS,-
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
 
1.1 Purpose
 
This document defines the procedure to be utilized in conducting
 
the Portable Oxygen Subsystem (POS) manned development test pro­
gram.
 
1.2 Scope
 
This document outlines and describes the item to be tested, test
 
conditions and objectives, test setups, performance requirements
 
and reporting requirements.
 
1.3 Test Objective
 
The objective of this test program is to verify that the POS com­
plies with the performance requirements of the POS specification
 
CSD-SH-025.
 
1.4 Description of Test Item
 
The test item is the Portable Oxygen Subsystem which is defined
 
schematically in Figure 1. The test unit is defined by drawing
 
SVSK 90390 and shall have been man rated per Test Plan POS-1.
 
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
 
Drawings
 
SVSK 90390 Portable Oxygen Subsystem
 
Standards
 
MIL-O-27210 Oxygen Aviators Breathing, Liquid and Gas
 
Specifications
 
CSD-SH-025 Specification for Design and Performance
 
Requirements for Shuttle Portable Oxygen
 
Subsystem (Prototype Only)
 
HS 3150 Cleanliness Levels, High ..... Processing,
 
Testing and Preservation of Parts Subjected
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3.0 TEST SEQUENCE
 
Test Test Number
Sequence 

1 Examination of Product 5.1
 
2 Prestart Up and Check Out 5.2
 
3 Mission Test - Steady State 5.3
 
5.1
4 Examination of Product 

5 Prestart Up and Check Out 5.2
 
6 Mission Test - Prebreath 5.4
 
4.0 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
 
4.1 Rigor
 
The test program shall be conducted under the direction of the
 
cognizant project engineer. Hamilton Standard inspection shall
 
be on a surveillance basis only. Any changes to the approved
 
test plan will be coordinated with NASA.
 
4.2 Reporting
 
The results of the test program will be included in the monthly
 
progress reports.
 
4.3 Control of the Test Item
 
It shall be the responsibility of the project engineer to insure
 
that the historical log sheets reflect all operations performed
 
on the test article during the test program.
 
4.4 Equipment Logs (Test Logs)
 
The test operator shall obtain sufficient data to verify that the
 
test conditions and environmental conditions have been controlled
 
as specified herein. This log will be maintained by the test
 
operator(s). In general, the log shall include, but not be
 
limited to, the following data:
 
a. Test Title and Procedure Section Number
 
b. Date
 
c. Environmental Conditions
 
d. Test Operator
 
e. Test Equipment
 
f. Notes and Comments
 
g. Test Results
 
4.5 Failure Reporting
 
A Reliability Data Report (RDR) containing a test description,
 
actual test conditions, and test results shall be prepared for
 
any test result which does not meet requirements. All RDR'S
 
must be cleared before delivery of the unit.
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4.6 Environmental Requirements
 
Unless otherwise specified, testing shall be conducted at local
 
Correction shall
ambient temperatures and barometric pressure. 

be made to provide agreement with the temperature and pressure
 
calibration of the instruments.
 
4.7 Cleanliness Requirements
 
The supply gas shall be filtered through a 15 micron absolute
 
filter. The high pressure supply shall be cleaned to HS 3150
 
CD-3. The breathing circuit instrumentation and connecting
 
lines shall be cleaned with freon and shall be free of oil
 
and visible contaminants.
 
4.8 Instrumentation
 
The instrumentation required for this test is shown in Figures 2
 
and 4 and listed in Table I. The surface temperature thermocou­
ples will be located as specified by engineering and will be
 
attached with a thermally conductive epoxy. A Bristol recorder
 
or equivalent shall be used to record all temperature readouts.
 
4.9 Test Gas
 
The test gas will be oxygen per MIL-O-27210.
 
4.10 Test Subject
 
Prior to initiation of the test program, the test subject shall
 
have been approved by Medical and shall have completed a metabol­
lic calibration per SS/SSP2135, paragraphs 5.1 through 5.1.3.4.
 
4.11 Medical Coverage
 
Prior to starting each test, the Medical and Safety supervisors
 
shall be notified. An adequately trained medical monitor shall
 
The proximity of the
be available, as required, for each test. 

medical monitor during each test shall be agreed to by the Med­
ical and Safety Supervisors and the test conductor prior to
 
starting any of the tests defined herein.
 
4.12 Safety Precautions
 
If the inlet C02 partial pressure exceeds 1.99 KPa (15 mm of Hg)
 
or if the inspired temperature exceeds 490 C (1200 F) at any point
 
during the test, the test shall be terminated by removing the
 
mask from the subject and shutting the 02 supply off.
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5.0 TEST PROCEDURE
 
5.1 Examination of Product
 
Examine the unit to verify the presence of a fresh cartridge and
 
that all instrumentation hookups are proper. Set up the unit as
 
shown in Figure 2 and evacuate to 3 in H20 below ambient to ver­
ify 	pressure integrity. The flow to vacuum required to maintain
 
a constant pressure shall not exceed 25 scc/min. Record data on
 
log sheet 6.1.
 
5.2 Prestart Up Check Out
 
Prior to donning the POS, the test subject shall conduct a pre­
start up check out consisting of:
 
Check Point 	 Procedure
 
a. Bottle Pressure Turn on rig supply to 900 + 20 psig.
 
Verification 	 Verify bottle gage is read-ng same as
 
rig gage + 160 psi.
 
b. 	LiOH Cartridge Verify green indicator pin is visible.
 
Indicator Check
 
Out
 
c. 	Exhalation Check Shut off 02 supply. Exhale and inflate
 
Valve Performance breathing bag. Attempt to inhale from
 
mask. Breathing bag should not collapse
 
and crewman should not be able to inhale.
 
d. Check Relief Open canister, inhale from mask and
 
Valve Leakage exhale to ambient. Once breathing bag
 
is collapsed, crewman should not-be
 
able to inhale from system.
 
e. 	02 Supply Turn on 02 supply, place mask to face
 
Subsystem Check and inhale deeply. Crewman should feel
 
Out 	 flow in oral nasal area (demand regula­
tor). Hold breath for about 5 seconds,
 
crewman should feel flow entering at
 
spray bar. Check interstage; pressure
 
should read 33.5 + 6 psi.
 
5.3 Mission Test Steady State
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5.3.1 	Preparation of Test Subject
 
The test subject will adhere to the following conditions:
 
a. 	Will not deviate from his normal diet.
 
b. 	Obtain a minimum of eight (8) hours sleep on the night pri,
 
to the test.'
 
c. 	Abstain from drinking alcoholic beverages for twenty-four
 
(24) hours before the test.
 
d. 	Refrain from food consumption for three (3) hours prior to
 
the test.
 
Approximately one-half hour before the start of test preparation,
 
the 	test subject will be given a pretest-physical examination
 
which includes blood pressure, pulse rate, and temperature.
 
Bioinstrumentation will be positioned on the test subject as
 
shown in Figure 3.
 
The test subject will don test clothing which consists of light
 
weight gym clothes. Footwear will be sneakers or equivalent.
 
5.3.2 	Test Preparation
 
Set up the unit as shown in Figure 4.
 
Allow all instrumentation to warm up over night before this test.
 
Turn on instrumentation line heaters and maintain the lines near
 
the 	mask at approximately 120OF and the lines near the cartridge
 
at approximately 1800 F.
 
Verify 	that all dew pointers provide consistent readings.
 
-Verify that all C02 detectors provide consistent readings.
 
Verify that the N2 and 02 detectors provide readings consistent
 
with room air.
 
5.3.3 	 Test Performance
 
With Vl closed, adjust Pl to 900 + 20 psig and recordthe 02
 
bottle weight.
 
The test subject shall don the mask and attempt to inhale. The
 
ability to inhale or evidence of any flow indicates an external
 
leak which must -e eliminated prior to starting the test.
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5.3.3 (Continued)
 
Once the system is leak tight, open Vl and the canister actuator
 
and start the test clock.
 
The subject shall mount the treadmill and start walking. He
 
shall adjust his speed to maintain a heart rate equivalent to
 
800 Btu/hr as established by the metabolic calibration.
 
The subject shall maintain this condition until the inlet C02
 
partial pressure exceeds 7.6 mm Hg.
 
When the inlet C02 partial pressure exceeds 7.6 mm Hg, the sub­
ject shall remove the mask and V1 shall be closed. The final 02
 
bottle weight shall be recorded.
 
All test data (log sheet 6.3) shall be recorded five minutes
 
after start up and at 30 minute intervals thereafter.
 
After the first 30 minutes of operation, the flow to the two lira
 
C02 analyzers shall be shut off. The flow shall be reestablished
 
for each reading about two minutes before the reading is to be
 
made.
 
Note: During this test, TCG6 should be within 50F of TCG5. If
 
needed, the breathing bag may be heated using a heat lamp. If
 
heat is added, all areas except the bag must be shielded from the
 
heat lamp.
 
The mask inlet conditions shall be monitored continuously during
 
the run with particular attention to the safety precautions
 
defined in Section 4.12.
 
The nitrogen level shall be less than 5% after 10 minutes of
 
operation. The inspired C02 (cartridge outlet) shall not exceed
 
7.6 mm Hg for at least three hours. Vision shall not be obscured
 
by fogging on the inside of the visor. Inspired temperature and
 
dew point shall not exceed ll0OF and 100OF respectively.
 
5.4 Mission Test - Denitrogenization
 
This test will be identical to the previous run except that after
 
two hours and 42 minutes of operation the work rate will be in­
creased to 1,100 Btu/hr for 15 minutes and then 1,500 Btu/hr for
 
three minutes. The work rate will then be reduced to 800 Btu/hr
 
for the remainder of the run. The requirements are the same as
 
for the steady state test except that at the higher metabolic
 
work rates the inspired C02 can be a maximum of 15 mm Hg.
 
5.5 
POS-P-2 
.HAMILTON STANDARD 0 
1EcSNOWESM 
Post Test Servide
 
(less

Subsequent to the manned testing, the breathing circuit 

cartridge) shall be washed by flushing with soapy distilled 
water
 
The unit shall
 followed by a thorough rinse with distilled water. 

be dried by flowing dry nitrogen through the breathing 
circuit
 
until the outlet dew point is less than 0°F.
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TABLE I 
INSTRUMENTATION
 
Location 

Mask 

Hose/Regin' 

Hx Interface 

Cartridge 

Inlet 

Cartridge 

Outlet 

Gas 

Temperatures 

Skin 

Temperatures 

Parameter 

Gas Temperature 

02 

N2 

Dew Point 

Gas Temperature 

C02 

C02 

Dew Point 

C02 

Dew Point 

Supply Gas 

Bag Inlet 

Bag Outlet 

Cartridge Outlet 

Mask Visor 

Regen Hx Mask Side 

Regen Hx Bag Side 

Bag Inlet Duct 

Relief Valve Duct 

Cartridge Inlet 

Canister(3) 

Cartridge Outlet 

Back Panel Outside 

Radiation Grid 

Cover 

Symbol 

TCG2 

DPI 

TCG4 

C023 

C022 

DP2 

C021 

DP3 

TCG3 

TCG5 

TCG6 

TCGI 

TCs1 

TCS2 

TCs3 

TCs4 

TCs5 

TCs6 

TCs7,8,9 

TCs10 

TCsl 

TCsl2 

TCs13 

Range 

32-300°F 

0-100% 

0-100% & 0-20% 

32-120°F 

32-300°F 

0-20 mmHg 

0-40 mmHg 

32-180°F 

0-40 mmHg 

32-180°F 

32-300O F 

32-300°F 

32-300OF 

32-300 °F 

32-300°F 

32-300 °F 

32-300 °F 

32-300OF 

32-300°F 

32-300 °F 

°
 32-300 F 

°
 32-300 F 

32-300°F 

32-300OF 

32-300°F 

Accuracy
 
+ 20F 
T 2% 
T 2% 
T 20 F 
+ 20 F
 
+ .1% 
+ 1 mmHg
 
P 20 F
 
+ 1 mmHg
 
+ 20F 
+ 20 F
 
+ 20 F
 
T 20 F
 
T 20F
 
+ 20F
 
+ 20F
 
20 F
 
+ 20 F
 
+ 20F
 
T 20F
 
T 20F
 
T 20F
 
T 2°F
 
+ 20 F
 
+ 20 F
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Instrument Manufacturer Model Range Accuracy Response Time 
DP(1) EG&G 992 0-120°F + 1 ° F 30F/Sec 
DP(2)+DP(3) Cambridge Systems 
(now EG&G) 
108 0-180 + 1F 1F/SeC 
02 Westinghouse 209P 0-100% + 1.5% 1 Sec 
N2 Med Science Elect. 300AR 0-100% 
80-100% 
60-80% 
40-60% 
20-40% 
0-20% 
+ 1% FS 
T 1% FS 
T 1% FS 
T 1% FS 
+ 1% FS 
T 1% FS 
Not Specified 
C02(I)+C02(2) M.S.A. Lira 300 90% of Reading in 5 Sec 
C02 (3) Beckman LB-1 0-1% C02 
1-10% CO2 
.3 mmHg 
.1% 
90% 
Sec 
FS in 0.1 
FM-I 
0 - 100 CC/MIN 
0o
+ 2% FS 
oF 00CIN TIGCRUTL G EU
 
FI
 
-4 
I 
BIO-INSTUMEUTATION LOCATIONS 
43A BF 
J \ JO( B I1 
D C1 

EKG
 
t A- Sternum 
;B ,-.Sterhm O 
C Axilltry 

D - Axillary
 
E - Ground
 
F - Ground 
FIGURE 3
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.75 1A I16d TYPE OF TEST SHEET OF DATE
.H a mn iltoSt nd ard J.,sEOA.,.Hamilton Standard flcR .rt Cofo A,.oJ., TEST EN OIN TEST PLAN NO.fl EE MODEL. NO.WINDSOR LOCKS, CONNECTICUT 06096 'ES 
A 
NAME OF RIG 
MPART NO. 
PAR
T NO. 
SPACE &LIFE SYSTEMS LABORATORY SERIAL NO. 
LOGOFTEST Sheet 6.1 PROJECT & ENG. ORDER NO. OPERATORS 
New Cart jdq Ins allEd I 
es 
I No 
No 
___ 
P:tessvre Fl ow 
HH 
Req irement 
Actu al 
in H0 25 scc min ax 
REMARKS:
 
83538
 
H -t751A 1/60 	 TYPE OF TEST SHEET OF DATE 
U 	 TEST P[A . ... 
0V0SNOCU ITED AIRCRAFT COC ATON TEST ENGINEER 	 TESr PLAN NC. 
MODEL NO. 
Hamilton Standard 
WINDSOR LOCKS, CONNECTICUT 06096 A 
PART NO. NAME OF RIG 
SERIAL NO.SPACE & LIFE SYSTEMS LABORATORY 
OPERATORSLOG OF TEST Sheet 6 . 2 PROJECT & ENG. ORDER NO. 
Yes No 
A. Bottle P ess re Verifcation - Does POS gag.e agree wi~h rig wi;hin + 16 ps? * 
B. LiO] Car rid e In icator Check Out Is indicator pin visible? * 
C. Exhalation Cleck 7ale Performance Dols baq collaps6 on inhaLaticn? 
D. Relief V ive Leakae Cad cre an inhale? 
E. 02 Suppli Sulsystem C1 eck but Doe crewmar feel dend low? * 
L' Doe crewmar feel mak upLof ow? * 
Doe in ers age gage read 33.5 + . psi. * 
REMARKS!
 
*Indicates required answer.
 
... - -8 	 3 5 3 7 
HSF-175.IA f/66 
HamiIton Standa rd,
WINDSOR LOCKS, CONNECTICUT 06096 
,,VIS 
H 
oUNIT..ACAT C...T. 
TYPE OF TEST 
TEST ENGINEER 
SHEET OF 
TEST PLAN NO.. 
MODEL NO. 
... 
DATE 
SPACE & LIFE SYSTEMS LABORATORY 
NAME OF RIG PART N O . 
SERIAL NO. 
LOG OF TEST Sheet 6. 3 PROJECT & ENS. ORDER NO. OPERATORS 
Time ime Bottle Pressure _ 02 N C0 2 D w 
ieartResp 
Pcmt 'RateRate 
Met 
Load 
lock!est Weight 
"Lb 
Su P1 
Psi 
Ms k 
in H20 
% % 
% 
1 
mmHg % 
21 
"mHg mHL SOF 
2 
2%OF 
3 
OF 
BPM BPM Btu/ r, 
REMARKS: 
Absence of Condensate
 
Absence of Free Water
 
] No8 3­
NSF17S.IA 1/66 '. TYPE OF TEST SHEET OF 0 " DATEHamilton Standard .TS..T TES PLA o 
CfUNITED AIRCRAFT CORPFOOATCN ________________________ TETPA oWINDSOR LOCKS, CONNECTICUT 06096 TEST ENGINEER MODEL NO. 
SPACE & LIFE SYSTEMS LABORATORY 
NAME OF RIG PART NO. 
SERIAL NO, 
LOG OF TEST Sheet 6.2 (Continued) 
PROJECT & ENG. ORDER NO. OPERATORS 
Test 
Time Temper ture OF 
1 2 
Ga s 
3 4 5 6 L 2 3 4 5 
Skin 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
83709
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